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than the

that

imagine more

three that

for

caused

no

be

harm

based

to

the

technical or

the Court of Appea1s

forfeiture,

this Court

should grant

c e r t io r a r i .

The first
transaction

security

1987

for

found breached two

"encumbrances"
of

alleged defaults were

(the December

Va1 ley Lank as

Appeals

two

pledge

financing),

however,

the

leasehold

which

lease provisions,

and a prohibition of

its Opinion,

of

really one

the Court

of

a covenant

"assignments."

the Court of

to

Appeals

At

against
page 5

apparently

acknowledged that the a 1 leged encumbiance created by the trust
deed was

not

"legally enforceable"

and had

no

"legal

effect."

at cage (> the Court of Appeoa Is found the a 1lege d

Similarly,

assignment to be a default justifying forfeiture? "regardless of
the

legal

effect

of

an

actual

or

purported

transler."

The final a 1leged det auIt was the failure to keep
property

freer

lorfoiture

to

control were

from weeds.

be

justi t ied even

reasonable.

Eorfeiture on

contractual

The.; Court

penalty,

which

facts

is not

time of purported termination,

Appeals

it Manivest's

(Opinion,

these

of

pp.
is

found

efforts

at

weed

6-7.)

nothing more

permitted by

law.

than

At

a

the

the parties were only about

-8-

the

h.-i'.f

way through a 50-year ground
termination

resulted

windfa 11

the Howes)

to

lease.

in a cash

flow

the

premature

,jss to M.-iruvest

trial

court

( -.rid
o-

between

$500,000 and $600,000 when discounted to present value.

On the

other hand,

that

Thus,

found to

nowhere does the Court or Appeals suggest 'hat any

ha rm, to the Howes

resulted f rom the three purported de: au 1ts .

While the Court cf Appeals considered oniy tr.- three
ci 1 leged defaults discus sec

above,

the

trial court

bast : its

forfeiture award upon the cumulative effect of a myr ia i of
other alleged defaults as well.

However,

the Court of

Appeals

implicitly ruled that, these latter alleged defaults c~.ld not

be considered because they were not the subject
tc Manivest.
Manivest

Opinion,

pp. 2-3, n.2 and p.

is entitled to a new trial

7.

or

any not ice

At mir.i'um,

to determine whetre-r a

finder of fact would award forfeiture, without the taint of the

a1leged defaults that we re not. the sub] ect of any not i -e.
Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged tr-

Howes'

implied contractua1 covenant of good faith and fair d<•.1r ng,
attempted to avoid the imp 1red covenant by rul ing fha*

it

Mam vest

waited too long to request, the Howes' consent to the Y.-iley
ban/:, transaction.

However , the Com t of Appeals over . jked

fhat , even assuming consent was regi. .r red, an ea rI:er
wouId have been futile,
Howes
as

that

civen the bad

they were enti tled to

a condition of

giving consent.

r•-ques-

faith posrtion :• the

renegotiate the

rents ! amount

I.

THE COURT OE APPEALS DEPARTED FROM PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS
COURT, AND FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, BY AFFIRMING LEASE FORFEITURE BASED UPON
THREE ALLEGED DEFAULTS THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND
TO

Man ivest's

jurisdictions,
is not

BE

TECHNICAL

briers

cited

AND

HARMLESS

cases

from

Utah

and

uniformly ho 1d ing that forfeiture of

permi tted absent a materi31

(Manivest open 1ng Brief,

a contract

breach of that contract.

pp . 39-44 , App.

authorities also show the analysis

other

to

"J". )

be

These

roll owed

distinguishing materi a 1 breaches f rom technical

in

breaches,

wh ich cannot support a forfeiture because they cause no real
harm to the party seeking this most drastic remedy.
The Court of Appea 1s ' doc is ion abandons

uniformly followed principles of

(Id.)

t. hese

law governing forfeiture,

and

fails to provide any meaningful analysis showing why the three
alleged defaults considered by the Court
Instead,

justify forfeiture.

the Court's Opinion highlights the

three alleged defaults

A.

could not

be

a basis

reasons why these
for

forfeiture.

I he Alleged "Encumbr ance" and "Ass :gnm,ent."

pefaults_ Resu 111 ng From the 1987 ~Va1 ley
Bank T ran sact 1o n We re Not a Propei_r__ Las 1s
L0 L.fJtOJjJ111 n3 Dor fe 1ture Because The Con rot
of Appea 1s Found They Had No Legal Ef_f_ect .
The Conrt of Appea1s apparently accepted Mani vest 's
argument

that the trust deed had no

legal

effect on the Howes'

fee interest , because Man 1vest, could not mortgage any more than
it had,

wh ich was only t he

ruled that
a

"legal

lease covenant

leaseho Id .

impossibility
against

is

[not]

encumbrances",

-10-

No net he less,
a defense
that

the Cou rt
to

"whether

breach o!
the

Valley Bank trust deed
whether Manivest
and

that

of

its

breached

"Manivest

encumbrances,

is legally e n fc rc e ab 1e is im.s at-•r 1a_l

breached

therefore,

le?ga 1 effect".

Similarly,

at

the covenant against

the

against

encumbi .onces" ,

lease covenant

against

by recording the trust deed :t-ga rd 1e ss

Opinion,

page 6,

leg a 1 ef rect of

the oovenant.

to

pp.

the Court

4-5

(emphasis adder:).

ruled that

assigrmoent,

"Manivest

therefore,

t,: eached

re g a rd 1e s s of

an actual or p u rp orted transfe r. "

tine

(2:o nasis

added.)

In so

Peat ress,

ruling,

595 P.2d 866

1n Brewer,

the Court

relied solely upon 15: ewe r v .

(Utah 1-79).

That reliance is misplaced

the grantor conveyed by wa rranty deed prop- :ty

: ncluded within a Special

Improvement District

prior

A It ho ugh

to

the conveyance.

the District

construction of the improvements prior
property was

not

assessed,

and

that w,;

the

created

comm.er. ted

to the conveyance,

assessment

lien die

the

not

become ef fect ive, until after the conveyance.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals'
issue in Brewer was

not whether

District encumbered the

interprets* .on,

the Specia 1 Improvement

property,

but when the encum.o: ance

occu rred , for purposes of dete i;nt n ing whether

the g rji tor

or eached the war rant ies

in the warranty deed at trie t :me of

conveyance.

mere ly

This Court

the

ra led

that

since

the

construction of the improvements beian before the core, eyance,
and the costs of
the property,

construction ultimately would

the property was encimoeied at

- 11-

be

nso usable to

"he fi:">_-

•:"

* h->

conveyance,
that

especially since? the grantor

knew of these facts at

t ime.

The Court of AppeaIs cor rect1y noted that

defines an encumbrance as "any rjght
in

land which constitutes

a

that a third person holds

burden or

r igrits of the fee title ho Ider ."

limitation upon

Opinion,

added); citing Brewer at 59:3 P.2d 868.

the Court of Appeals'

analysis,

Brewer

p.

the

5 (emphasi s

However, contrary to

that definition requires that

the third party have some legal "right" to burden or limit the
fee

interest.

In Brewer

const ruction of

that

the improvements,

ultimately a 1bow the Special
the fee

that

Accordingly,
"[w]hether

unmater i a 1 to

the

Improvement

by statute,

interest,

there

lien was

improvements,

or

in Brewer" .

party

has

no

Dint tried.,

whet, her

Opinion,

leg a 1 right

had not

If,

if

necessary,

the property for
to

imp ro vernent.s
assess

the

the

p.

in stating
thus

1 ien

j.

Untier

to burden

the fee

in Br ewe_r , the?

leogal

right

to

t.hat were constructed,

property anyway,

might be "burdened" by having to dofeond against the1

-12-

lien.

constructed the

had no statutory or other

wrongfully attemptexl

and,

1ega 1ly enforceable was

is no "encumbrance".

Improvement

would

District to "burden"

the Cour t of Appea1s erred

the Cour t 's an lays is of

Breweu , if the third

assess

which,

interest to satisfy the assessment

encumbered the proper ty

Special

right was created by the

interest by levying the assessment,

by foreclosing on

that,

legal

but

the grantee

illegal

assessment,

but that

illegal

assessment would not breath the

grantor's war ranty against "encumbrances".
Similarly,
"encumbrance" of

here,

the Valley Bank trust deed was not an

the "demised premises",

interest therein,

or

the Howes'

because it gave Valley Bank no

fee

legal

"right"

to "burden" anything other than Manivest's leasehold.
Valley Bank had foreclosed on that, trust deed,
been

no

burden on

trustee can sell

the Howes'
is

what

fee

the

trustor

Code Ann.

§ 57-1-28(2)

the Court

of AppeaIs'

Opinion,

"legal effect"

is not

•without
covenant

against

sufficient

24 6 P.

386,

387

to warrant

(Okla.

Covenants, Condi t ions,
also,

5 A.L.R.

c 1aims to or

1084,

aga inst

(Man 1vest)

even a.

Thus,

technical

encumbrances,

See

also,

all

that

owns.

Jtan

ass 1cnmenf

breach
much

See,
20 Am.

the

contrary to

an encumbrance or

forfeiture.

lc<26);

there wild have

because

(1953 as amended).

assignments or

breach

interest,

Even if

)f

a

le: s a

Man ley v.
Jur.

Poo 1 ,

2o,

and Rest r_ict :ons , § 83 , p . 647, n .9 ; See

1086-1087,

Anriot.

Unfounded outs' inrijjig

rea 1 prope rty .is breach of coven :nf_s

of

seed .

Also,

eifeet of

the Court of

the "ass ignment"

Appeal:;'

reference

to Va 1 lev Bank purports

only Manivest's a rgument that any ass ignment
purview of

the "unassignable"

a nullity,

rather

a rgument on this
that

a

language of

than a default.
issue,

lease assignment

to

tt

legal

add ress

falling within the

lease

However,

the

paraq•aph 4 was

Manivest'

if her

-which was over looked by the C ur f , was
given st'lely as

security tor

• Lan

is

not. precluded by a general

covenant against

(App . ".I" , p . 7 7 ; Manivest Reply Brief,
Ultimately,
Trial

even the Howes

Brief,

R.

B.

4.35,

App.

lease assignments.

App . "K" , pp . 10-13.)

agreed with this position.
"M" ,

pp.

18,

(Howes'

30.)

We?eds Remaining After Manivest 's_ Reasonable

Effor ts at Weed Cont ro I Ai so We r_e Not, A
Pr oper Basi s Joo r Af f irmi ng Fo rtei ture
In response to Manivest 's a rguniont that it should be
held only to a standard of

on the property,
however , was

applied",

reasonab 1eness

in cont ro 1ling weeds

the Court of Appea 3s stated that "[T]he lease,

s i lent

as

to

the st a rid a rd of

and that "[i If t.he parties

ma in ten a nee to

intended t. hat maintenance?

would be governed by a reasonableness standard,
have

included

it

These-

irite rp ret af ior

in the contract".

statements

that

performance,

presumed or

inplied.

459,

(Wash.

464

(Wash.

premises
repairs

App.

in
as

business.)

Appeals

The Rrower: Co.

To

Cf . , Puget

1^50)

(Lease providing

apparently did,
A single weeel

result

in

forfeiture,

lessee went
Wei nor

Inv.

rule

of

to

Oarrison,

the

Co.

v.

that

be

468 P.2d 464,

Wenck,

tenant

to

conduct

221

P.2d

maintain

tenant's

as

leads to

rersulfs.

ludicrous

left growing
regardless of

t.he Court,

t.he

Texas , 3 8'i

-14-

of

on the property could
lengths

to

which

to exterminate-1 weed growth.

Co . of

contract

reasonableness will

absolute? standard,

in attempting

v . Wi 1s n ire; Oil

6-7 . )

repair ' reguirod only such

"reasonably necessary"
an

pp.

settled

v.

1970);

apply

the^y should

is s i leint as

a standard of

'first class state? of
were

the

where a contract,

standard of

473

(Opinion,

overlook

be

P .7(1 8 08 , 8 0 8

the

See,
(Kan.

1964)

(In

interpreting a contract

the terms of

the contract

A party should not be
contract,

stating,

reasonably",
will

a:i

to

" [r 1esi. 1ts which ...: educe

absurdity should be

required to

include a provision

"This contract will

and instead has a right

interpret

it reasonably,

"Manivest was cited

weeds on the property".
that, one of

34) , over a year

this

litigation was

Apr 1 1 2 1,

1983

Not ice of

Defau11.

could

have

However,

(Ex.

been

C.

a

The Cou rt of

or" •tng

the Court also over!

rorfeitu:e,

five years

neither of

oketl

10 , 198-

The otner citation was

Accordingly,
for

the Court of Apnea .. a 1so

pu rpoi ted

23) , almost

basis

to expect that a court

issued on July

after the

pendi ng .

.n a

interpreted

by Mo r ray City for

these citations was

(Ex.

be

ided".)

1:1 .

At page 7 of the Opinion,
stated that

av

before

aid whi1e
...sued on

f.ie

- i rsf

these citations

torreiture.

Appea 1s'

Rat iona le For

Fo rfeitu re Pe nrit s That Remedy To Be Use 1
As An _I_m.o_e rm is s lo I_e _Co n t r_ac t u a 1 Pen a 1*y
Even assuming
weeds

constitute?:]

own descriptions
technical

breaches

of

brushed

gross

in e q u it ie s of
For

aside

some

all

of

they

of

"encumbrance",

the

lease,

quoted

Manivest's

the

Court,

"assignment"

the Court

really were.

forfeiture here,

reason,

the improvements.

the

these detaults,

and meaningless

Court

of

that

above,

of

snow

Appeals'

lust

Nonethei; ;s,

arguments ccnoe: :i:nc

how

the
the

except, o nn .
focused

only on

f so va Iue

After noting at t.he? beginning o:

Opinion that Man ives1: or

or

the

its p redecosso rs had an c p t i n t

purchase the property which they declined to exercise,
Court stated at page 7 of
We

have

the

the Op 1nion:

reviewed

the

remaining

arguments

ra ised on appea 1 concerning t.he appropr iateness of

forfeiture.

Because the option to

purchase had expired and the parties agreed
that

the Howes wou1d succeed to

rr.ents upon termination,
wi thout

the

impr oye-

we deem them to be

mer i t.

(Emphas is added.)

Whiie Man ivest agrees that the Court is not

requi red to specifically address each and eveiy argument raised
by the parties, Manivest
two most,

important
1.

the Howes,

was

f low f rom t.he

remain ing on

not

believes that the Court overlooked the

points:
The

real

loss

the value?

shopp ing

of

to

Manivest,

the

improvements,

center subleases over

the lease at the t ime of
this

$500,000

Finding No.

2.

a hint of
them

in

(App.

Nowhere

"E",
in

excess

of

half

a

million

The trial

loss and wi ndf a 1 1 to be
26.)
is there?

Instead,

this

is nothing mo re than a pen a 1t_y imposed upon Man ivest

a few weeds

despi te Manivest's

for

award

on

that in the Court et

Appea 1s ' own words had no " leg a 1 ef fect" , and
of

even

could justify an award to

dollars.

al legend encumbrance? and assignment

the cash

the 20-25 years

the Court's Opinion

any harm to the Howes t hat

but

forfeiture.

court found the present va lue of
- $60 0,000.

and wiridf a 1 1 to

for

the presence?

reasonable efforts

at

weed

to

trie

contro 1 .

On these

facts,

Howes by the tr ial court

a $500,000

pursuant

- $600,000

awnrd

to a contractual

- 1 6-

1 iquiclafed

damages
Abbott

provision wou id have to
v.

Goodwin,

is no

less

Alumet

v.

809

P.2d 716

a penalty when
Bear

it

be reversed as
(Ore.

results

Lake Grazing Co.,

App.

a pena 1t y.

1991);

Such an award

from forfeiture.

812 P.2d 253,

2 58

(Idaho 1991)

II .

BECAUSE

THREE

THE

THE

OF

APPEALS

TRIAL

ALDEGED

INDICATED

DEFAULTS

0\"LY

the three allegations of default
written notice to Manivest

the Opinion to mean that

Utah

Opinion considered only

that were the subject of

f rom the Howes,

Manlvest understands

these were the only three that

properly could be considered.
7.

PROPERLY

COURT.

Because the Court of Appea Is'

p.

COULD

THAT

BE
CONSIDERED, PRIOR DECISIONS BY THIS COURT ESTABLISH
THAT MANIVEST IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL FREE OF
THE TAINT OF THE EIGHT ADDITIONAL DEFAULTS FOUND BY
THE

OF

COURT

Opinion,

pp.

law reguires written notice of

2-3,

n. 2

default

irid

ano

opportunity to cure as a condition precedent to forfei-ure,
even if the lease does not.
However,

the trial

based upon ei ght additional
subject of written notice,

at trial.

(App.

the bench,

the trial court

alleged detaults

"K",

and

(App.
court's

"K", pp. 3-10.)
award of

forfeiture was

a 1 leged def au Its that were' not
and were

pp. 6-7.)

raised for

the first time

In issuing its decisi

recited

its

findings on

all

then stated:

The cumulative effect

and cause

1sic1

cour se of conduct by the defendants,

of

the

repre

sents in this Court's view ro mater i a 1 or each
of such a substantial nature that this Court
is persuaded the remedy sought [i.e., fcr-

feiture]
App.

"F",

p.

is appropriate.

7 (emphasis

added).

-17-

the

n from
of

these

Accord ing1y,
the eight

trial

a 1leged defaults

cons ide red .
Utah,

the

court's deci s ion was ta inted by

that

shouId not

have been

Under da_ck _B_!__ Parson Construction Co .__y_.

725 P.2d 614

(Utah
the

1986),

determine

whether

trial

proper or

improper grounds,

remand

for

a new trial,

decide

the

issue

when

court's

State of

an appellate court cannot
decision

was

based

on

the correct course of action is to

rat her

than for

the appei 1. at. e court

to

itself.
III.

THE

COURT

THIS

OE

COURT

APPEALS

THAT

RESERVES

A

REQUIRED

TO GIVE

RIGHT

REASONABLE

AND

IGNORED

WHERE

OF

A

PRIOR

PARTY

CONSENT,

ITS

GOOD

TO

DECISIONS

A

THAT

PARTY

CONSENT UNLESS
FAITH

BASTS

BY

CONTRACT

FOR

IS

IT HAS

A

WITHHOLDING

CONSENT.

Although
Appeals
faith,

at

page 6 of

its Op inion,

acknowledges the implied contractual
cooperation and
However,
of

good

fair

dealing,

as

a matter

ot

the? Court

a party

consent
If

so,

for

is

appears to

a good

reason,
Appea1s

a

bad
has

holding that,

faith,

consent cannot

The? Court of Appeals

for

consent

when

that

that

a

where

the consent

party may 'withhold
or

over 1ooked

be withheld

state

its contractual

icason,

based upon the

good

the duty

law,

in Pri nee v . Elm Inv . Co . , Incm_,

1982),

request

of

implying

required by contract,

the Cour t of

deci s ion

be

covenant of

the Cou rt goes on to

there is no violation of
faith,

party is simply exercising
rights.
Thus,

the Cou r t of

no

reason

at

all.

this Court's

64 9 P. 2d 820 (Utah

implied covenant ot good

arbitrarily.

also

was untimely.

-18-

indicates

However,

that,

that

the Manivest

tequesf Was

a imost
The

simultaneous with

assignment

the Manivest
1988

(Ex.

document

letter

8) .

If

dated

Dectstber

requesting consent

prior

had

no

to the

additional

dated

reasonable

basis

More

importantly,

p.

6),

the Court

futile,

and that where

(Wash.

1967).

As

appea 1 (App . "L" , pp . 36-37),

form of

amount.

giving consent

condition consent on an

the fac

even

to

the

ked

that

request con; •uit pi ior
of

per for: .nee

clear,

both

is

in

the

oid on

l: t he i r objection • r f lie

resolved,

they

•enegot iat ion of

no

t> ..

lease gave the? Howes tht

increase

that

net seer. :ng

18; Tr .6-8 , App . "N" )

absent

Since nothing in the

f>- :

good faith requires.

made

t.he consent document had be eon

intention of

basis

22,

Kreger v. Ha 1 1 , ;2 5 P .2d

the Howes

t r la i court (App . "G" , If If 17 and

Januai'.

and

but only the :ai:

a tender

that performance is excused.

643

17),

of Appea is over 1

if would have been futile for Manivest
the transaction,

(Ex.

the transac* ion

Manivest was

(Opinion,

issue .

for withhoIding c nsenr ,

treatment that the implied covenant of

638,

is

1987

transaction,

as another technicality.

"compelled condonation"

to

8,

for consent occurred shortly after

shou1d g ive them no
except

is

the Howes

withholding consent
request

the Va I .cy Hank t. r ansact ion a*

in rental,

they we re

rental

right to
.ot, as

trie Court

of Appea Is suggests , mere .y "exerci s irig core •actual

rights".

Instead,

they were

acting

- 1 q _

in

bad

faith.

CONvCLU_SI_ON

By interpr et ing the
realistically,
substance

and

lease median ist ica 1 :y rat tier

than
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John 0. Howe, Trustee; Robert
E. Howe and Bonnie F. Howe,
husband and wife; William K.
Evans and Carole H. Evans,
husband and wife, as Trustee;
and Judith H. Steenblik,

Plaintiffs,

OPINION'

(For Publication

Case

Appellees,

No.

910598-CA

FILED

and Cross-Appe11ants,

(April

3,

1992)

v.

Professional Manivest,

Inc.,

a

Utah corporation; Manivest
Corporation, a Utah
corporation,

Defendants, Appellants
and Cross-Appellees.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable J.

Attorneys:

Dennis Frederick

Ronald E. Nehring, Salt Lake City, for Appellants

Michael R. Carlston, Max D. Wheeler, Salt Lake City,
and Gerrit M. Steenblik, Phoenix, for Appellees

Before Judges Bench,
BENCH,

Greenwood,

and Orme.

Presiding Judge:

Professional Manivest, Inc. (Manivest) appeals from a
judgment by the trial court arising out of breach of lease.
The
trial court awarded damages, attorney fees, costs and expenses.
We

affirm..

FACTS

On October 15,

1960, J. E. Lefmherr, Herman L. Franks,

and

Stanford L. Hale (as partners doing business as Valley Shopping
Center)

leased land in Salt Lake County from Earl E. Howe,

John

(

0. Howe, Vivian Howe, and Maxine W. Howe (the Howes)1 under the
terms of a fifty-year ground lease.
The lessees had a fifteenyear option to purchase the property under the lease.
The
lessees were also prohibited from making any assignments except
to a corporation that would be organized to build the shopping
center.
The partners of Valley Shopping Center assigned the

lease to Soutnlake Shopping Center, Inc., Manivest's predecessorin-interest.
When the option to purchase expired in October
1975, only certain portions of the leased property had been
bought, leaving other parts subject to the lease without a
purchase option.

In December 19 87, Manivest sought a $4 million loan from
Valley Bank & Trust Company (Valley Bank), and assigned the
ground

lease as well

as the rents from all tenant subleases to

Valley Bank.
As security, Manivest also executed and recorded a
deed of trust in favor of Valley Bank.
After the trust deed had
been executed, delivered, and recorded, Manivest sought the
consent of the Howes to the assignment by sending them an
"acknowledgement."

The Howes refused to consent to the

assignment, specifically objecting to language of the
acknowledgement that would have subordinated their interest to
Valley Bank.

The undersigned acknowledges that the
Lessee is encumbering their interest in the
property and said loan is hereby approved as
required by said lease.
The Howes thereupon demanded that Manivest remove the trust

deed, and served Manivest a notice of default by a letter dated
March 30,

1988.

Manivest was

As grounds for default,

the letter cited that

in breach of

free

1.

The covenant to keep the premises

and

clear

of

all

liens

and

encumbrances2;
1.
The trial court found that co-plaintiffs John O. Howe; Robert
E. Howe and Bonnie F. Howe; William K. Evans and Carole H. Evans;
and Judith

H.

Steenblik are

successors-in-interest to the

original lessors.
2.

The Howes also discovered that Manivest had earlier recorded

trust deeds on the property in 1978 and 1982 to secure other
loans.
The Howes also learned that Manivest had quitclaimed real

property to Wallaby Enterprises in 1983.
Although the loans were
paid and the trust deeds released when the obligations were
(continued...)
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2.

The covenant not to assign the Lease

without (the lessor's] prior written consent;
and

3.

The

covenant to maintain

the

premises and to keep them free from weeds and
other obnoxious growth.

Manivest failed to cure the conditions complained of, and
the Howes sent Manivest a second notice of default on April 29,
198 8.
When the conditions remained unchanged, the Howes served
Manivest a notice of termination on May 31, 1988, demanding that
Manivest surrender the property.
Manivest refused to vacate the
premises.

Before receiving the termination notice,

Manivest had

assigned its interest in the lease to a trust, again unbeknownst
to the Howes, to liquidate all assets, including the Soutnlake
Shopping Center for the benefit of creditors on April 28, 1988.
In September 1988, Manivest apparently removed some,

but not

all of the encumbrances.
The Howes thereupon filed a complaint
against Manivest in November 1988 on the ground that the
assignments and encumbrances violated

the lease.

The Howes also

complained that Manivest's failure to maintain the property
constituted an

additional

lease violation.

Manivest

counterclaimed that the Howes had no valid reason for withholding
their consent to the assignment and,

therefore,

acted in bad

faith. While the case was still pending, Murray City notified
Manivest on July 10, 1989, that weeds growing on the property
violated a city ordinance.

The trial court found that Manivest had executed, delivered,
and recorded a trust deed on the leased property and maoo an
assignment of the lease in favor of Valley Bank.
The trial court
also found that weed growth and other lease violations were

substantial, and when taken together with the assignments and
encur.orances,

constituted

a material

breach of the

lease.

The

trial court dismissed Manivest's counterclaim, and ruled that
Manivest had

"forfeited"

its

interest

in the

leasehold estate to

the Howes.
The trial court then ordered possession, and entered
judgment in favor of the Howes in the amount of $24,489.50 as
"liquidated" damages for Manivest's continued use of the

2.
( . . .continued)
satisfied, none of the transactions had been entered into with

the Howes' knowledge or consent.
Inasmuch as the acts complained
of in the Howes' March 1988 default letter support a claim, for
breach of contract, we do not address the legal effect, if any,
of

the

earlier transactions.
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property,

$16,231.05 in related costs and expenses, and

$131,867.55

in attorney fees.

LEASE

A.

Standard of Review

Interpretation of an "unambiguous, integrated contract is a
question of law, which is reviewed on appeal for correctness."
Crowther v. Carter,

767 P.2d 129,

131 (Utah App.

1989).

A

cardinal rule in construing a contract is to give effect to the
intentions of the parties and, if possible, to glean those
intentions "from an examination of the text of the contract

itself."

LPS Hosp.

(Utah 1988).

v.

Capitol Life Ins.

Co.,

765 P.2d 857,

858

"It is a long-standing rule in Utah that persons

dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own
terms without the intervention of the courts to relieve either

party from the effects of a bad bargain."
Unionamerica,

Inc.,

B.

657 P.2d 743,

749

Hal Taylor Assocs.

v.

(Utah 1982).

Covenant Against Encumbrances

Manivest contends that the Valley Bank trust deed did not
encumber the Howes' reversionary fee interest because Manivest
could not have pledged more than its own leasehold estate to
Valley Bank.
Manivest argues that the trial court erred in
determining tnat the Valley Bank trust deed was a breach of the
covenant against encumbrances.
The lease required the lessee,
however, "to keep the demised premises free and clear of all
liens and encumbrances of any nature whatsoever."
The lease
prohibition against all encumbrances of any nature encompasses
each and every encumbrance.
Manivest breached the lease by
recording the trust deed, therefore, because the trust deed not

only encumbered Manivest's leasehold interest in the demised
premises, but also purported to encumber the Howes' fee interest.
Accordingly, we reject the argument that legal impossibility is a
defense to breach of a lease covenant against encumbrances.

The Utah Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Brewer v.

Peatross,

595 P.2d 866

(Utah 1979).

In Brewer,

the

grantors of a warranty deed argued that a lien in favor of an
improvement district did not legally encumber real property
because the lien did not attach until after an ordinance levying

assessment for the improvements came into effect.
Id. at 868.
Despite the argument that the property was not legally
encumbered, the court held the grantors liable for breach of the
covenant against encumbrances.
The court reasoned that the

property was encumbered because the existence of the improvements
was either known to the grantors or was discoverable from the
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record by the lien filed.

id.

Whether the lien was legally

enforceable was thus immaterial to the court's analysis of
whether the lien encumbered the property in Brewer.
Likewise,

whether the Valley Bank trust deed is legally enforceable is
immaterial to whether Manivest breached the covenant against
encumbrances.

In Brewer,

the Utah Supreme Court defined an "encur.orance"

as "any right that a third person holds in land which constitutes
a burden or limitation upon the rights of the fee title holder."
Id. The Valley Bank trust deed burdened the Howes' fee interest
until it was removed from the record because it purported to

limit their rights.

Manivest breached the lease covenant against

encumbrances, therefore,
of its legal effect.
C.

by recording the trust deed regardless

Covenant Against Assignment

Manivest contends that its assignment of the lease to Valley
3ank was not a breach of the covenant against assignment.
Manivest argues that a valid assignment could not have been
legally effected without the Howes' consent inasmuch as the lease
was, by its terms, unassignable.
The lease prohibition against
assignment is as follows:
4.
Lessees shall have the right to
assign this Lease and Option to purchase to a
corporation to be formed for the purpose of
carrying out the terms of this Agreement.
Such assignment shall not release the Lessee
of any liabilities hereunder.
Except as to
the assignment permitted pursuant to this
paragraph, this Lease shall be unassignable
except with

Provided,

the

prior

however,

consent

of

the

Lessors.

that the Lessees or their

assignee as herein provided shall have the
right to enter into subleases of portions of
the demised premises, provided, however, that
said

subleases

shall

not

attach

to

or

become

binding in any way upon the fee interest of
the Lessors;

that said Lessees shall be

limited to that class of business commonly
known

as

"retail

trade

and

service."

(Emphasis added.)

The Howes agreed to assignment of the lease to a corporation
that would build the shopping center.

Beyond the initial

assignment agreed to in the lease, however, the parties agreed
that the Howes'
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consent to any other future assignments would be

required as a prior condition of assignment.

Because it is the

mere act of assignment that constitutes a breach of the lease,

and not the legal effect of an assignment, we reject the argument
that the prohibition against assignment was limited to only those

assignments carrying some legal effect.
Like other provisions of
the lease, the lease term against assignment is enforceable.
Manivest also argues, in the alternative, that the Howes
acted in bad faith by arbitrarily withholding their consent to
the assignment.
In Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d
1319, 1321 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that
"there is implied in any contract a covenant of good faith and
cooperation, which should prevent either party from impeding the
other's performance of his obligations thereunder; and that one
party may not render it difficult or impossible for the other to
continue performance and then take advantage of the non
performance he has caused."
However, there is no violation of
the duty of good faith, as a matter of law, when a party is
simply exercising its contractual rights.
Heiner v. S.J. Groves
& Sons Co.,

790 P.2d 107,

115

(Utah App.

1990).

The Howes were not obligated to consent to every proposed
assignment.
Manivest's argument that the Howes could not
arbitrarily withhold their consent to an assignment of the lease

confuses the duty to seek their prior permission with compelled
condonation.
Manivest assigned the lease to Valley Bank without
first seeking or obtaining the Howes' consent.
The non
consensual assignment was not permitted by the lease.
Manivest
breached the covenant against assignment, therefore, regardless
of the legal effect of an actual or purported transfer.
D.

Duty to Maintain

Manivest argues that the lease imposed a duty to keep the
premises only "reasonably" free from weeds.
The lease, however,
was silent as to the standard of maintenance to be applied:
5.
Lessee agrees to be responsible for
the entire demised premises, and during the
term

of

the

keep

it

free

lease to maintain the same

and

from weeds and other obnoxious

growth; that it will not allow any of its
lessees to conduct any business or perform
any act in violation of the ordinances
orregulations [sic] of Murrary [sic] City,
the

laws

States

(Emphasis added.)
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of

the

State of

Government.

Utah

or the

United

Manivest was cited by Murray City for growing weeds on the

property.

Because the condition was a violation of Murray City

ordinance and Manivest allowed the condition to exist, Manivest
was in breach of the lease for failure to maintain the premises

free from weeds or obnoxious growth.
If the parties intended
that maintenance would be governed by a reasonableness standard,
they should have included it in the contract.
However, "[w]e
will not rewrite a contract to alleviate a contracting party's

mistake,

but will construe it according to its terms as written."

Hoth v. White,

799 P.2d 213,
E.

217

(Utah App.

1990).

Remedy for Breach

The lease imposed a sixty-day cure period for breach of any
of the lease covenants, and further provided that the lease would
terminate automatically without notice if breach was ncz cured.
9.
Should Lessees fail to pay the rent
herein reserved or make any of the other

payments or charges to be paid by them
hereunder or fail to keep any covenant herein
contained to be performed by Lessee,

or

within sixty (60) days thereafter, then in
that event, without notice from the Lessors,
this Agreement shall cease and terminate, and
the

Lessees

the

Lessor.

shall

surrender

said premises

to

(Emphasis added.)
Manivest

covenants,
of.
lease

notified

of

the

breach

of

three

lease

and had sixty days to cure the conditions complained

Manivest

time.

was

took

no

action to cure the defaults

The trial court,
terminated

as

a

therefore,

result

of

within that

correctly determmea that the

Manivest's

breach.

As long as the lease remained "in full force and effect,"
the parties agreed that "[a]11 improvements placed upon said
demised premises shall remain the property of the Lessees."
The
Howes,

therefore,

succeeded to the improvements on the property

upon termination.
We have reviewed the remaining argurents
raised on appeal concerning the appropriateness of forfeiture.
Because the option to purchase had expired and the parties agreed
that the Howes would succeed to the improvements upon
termination, we deem them to be without merit.
See State v.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989 •(appellate court not

required to analyze and address in writing each and every
argument, issue, or claim raised on appeal).
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ATTORNEY

FEES

AND

COSTS

The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Howes on

May 18, 1990,

and awarded them fees,

expenses and costs.

The

trial court further directed that the amount of attorney fees and

costs "would be established by a supplemental judgment."

The

Howes applied for fees, expenses and costs approximately five
weeks later.
The trial court supplemented the earlier judgment
with specific amounts as to costs, expenses, and fees.
On
appeal,

Manivest challenges the award of attorney fees,

expenses

and costs on the ground that the Howes did not make timely
application for them under Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure.

Attorney fees may be awarded in Utah "only if authorized by
statute or contract."

Dixie State Bank v.

Bracken,

764

P.2d 985,

988 (Utah 1988).
The Howes were contractually entitled to an
award of a reasonable attorney fees under the lease executed in
1960

as

follows

20.

The Lessors and Lessees each agree

that should they default in any of the
covenants or agreements contained herein,

the

defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's

fee,

which may arise or accrue from enforcing

this Agreement, or in obtaining possession of
the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing

any remedy provided hereunder or by the
statutes

of

the

State

of

Utah

whether

such

remedy is pursued by filing a suit or
otherwise.

(Emphasis added.)
Under the express terms of the contract, the Howes are
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee, costs and expenses

incurred at trial and on appeal.
773 P.2d 841,

846

(Utah App.

See G.G.A.,

1989).

appropriate expense of litigation.

Inc. v. Leventis,

Costs are also an

Because the time limitation

of Rule 54(d)(2) does not apply to expenses or attorney fees, the
rule does not bar the award.
The trial court's calculations were

supported by evidence in the record.
P. 2d at 988-89.
fees,

costs,

Accordingly,

we affirm the award of attorney

and expenses.

CONCLUSION
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See Dixie State Bank, 764

Manivest breached the lease covenant to maintain the

premises as well as the covenants against assignment, and
encumbrances.
The lease was terminated by Manivest's separate
breach cf three lease covenants.
The Howes were thereby entitled

to possession of the premises and an award of attorney fees,
expenses and related costs.

/
Russell

W.

Bench,

Presiding Judge

I

CONCUR:

Pameia T.

I

Greenwood,

Judge

DISSENT:

^r V., m*^ ^-_,.
Gregory ii^ Orme, Judge
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Appellants

Utah Ccun oi Appeals

City Centre I, Suite 900
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East

Fourth South

Salt Lake City, Utah
(801)

64111

524-1000
UTAH

IN

COURT

JOHN O. HOWE, Trustee; ROBERT E.
HOWE and BONNIE F. HOWE, nusoand
and wife; WILLIAM K. EVANS and
CAROLE H. EVANS, husband and
wife, as Trustee; and JUDITH H .

OF

APPEALS

Case

No.

910L98-CA

STEENBLIK,

Plaintiffs

and Appellees,
MOTION,

vs .

ORDER

PROFESSIONAL

MANIVEST,

a Utah corporation;

FILING

INC. ,

STIPULATION AND

TO

EXTEND

PETITION

TIME

FTP

FOR

REHEARING

and

MANIVEST CORPORATION,

a Utah

corporation,
Defendants

and

Aooeliants.

MOTION

Pursuant

to Rule 2 2, Utah Rules of

Appellate

Procedure, Appellants hereby move tne Court for an Orcer

extending the time for filing their Petition for Rer.ea ring from
April 17, 1992, to April 24, 1992.

The grounds for t.-.is Motion

are that this Court's Opinion issued on April

3,

1992,

was not

received by the counsel for Appellants until April 6, 1992, and
RINCE. YEATES
1 QELDZAHLER
• C*ntr» I. Suit* 900
Eai! ^ourtn South

&*lt L»*» City
Jl»r 84111

mOT) 524-1000

that after review of the Opinion and discussion between

Appellants and their counsel, a decision to file tne Petition

was not made until April 10, 1992.

Accordingly, Appellants

require an additional week within whicn to file their

Petition.

Appellants have not previously sought an extension

for

this

f i1 in q

DATED

Petition.
this

day of April,
PRINCE,

s

1992.

YEATES

A.

t*

GELDZAHLER

Boevers

torneys for Appellants

STIPULATION

Appellants and Appellees hereby stipulate that the

time for filing Appellants' Petition be extended from April 17,
1992,

to April 24, 1992.

DATED this

day of April,
PRINCE,

1992.

YEATES

J/Gm^s A.

& GELDZAHLER

Boevers

orneys for Appellants

SNOW,

CHRISTENSEN

R.

&

MARTINEAU

Carlston

Attorneys for Appellees
•INCE. YEATES
QELDZAHLER

>nlr» f. Suit* 800
,»»t Fourth Soutn

jjit Lakf City
Ut»fi Brflti

S01) 524-1000

-i~

>aL

App3i«e
:•r*^ Court

ORDER

•^u, ior Appeals

Based upon tne

foregoing Motion and Stipulation,

HEREBY ORDERED that the time for filing Appellants'
for

Rehearing

is extended from April 17,

1992,

IT IS

Petition

to April 24,

1992.

DATED this __l^T~oay of April, 1992.
3Y THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE

OF

I hereby certify that,
1992,
the

HAND

DELIVERY

on tne

/O

foregoing

MOTION,

SNOW,

to

R. Carlston
CHRISTENSEN &

the following:

MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
54145

9019G
041592

WINCE. YEATES
t QELDZAHLER
Centra I. Suit* 900

• n 8*iti

i

i 524 100C

day of April,

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO EXTEND TIME FOR

Michael

E»il Fourtfi South

---,

I caused to oe hand-delivered a true and correct copy of

FILING PETITION FOR REHEARING

Salt Lam City

•--—

-3-

CERTIFICATE

OF

MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 21st day of April, 1992, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
Ronald E. Nehring
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
Attorneys at Law
175 East 400 South, #900

Salt Lake City,
Michael
Max

D.

R.

UT

84111

Carlston

Wheller

Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.

O.

Box

3000

Salt Lake City,

UT

84110

Gerrit M.

Steenblik

Jennings,

Strouss & Salmon

Attorneys at Lav/

One Renaissance Square
Two

North

Pheonix,

Central

Arizona

85004-2393

Dated this 21st day of April,

By

- .. •

T

•/•'/-•-/:

Deputy Clerk

1992.

RLED
IN THE

UTAH

COURT

OF API^-.->S

MAY141992

ooOoo

ORDER

John 0. Howe, Trustee;
Robert E. Howe and Bonnie F.

Howe,
K.

husband and wife; William

Evans

and

Carole H.

Cterk of the Court
Utah Court ot Appeals

Evans,

husband and wife, as Trustee;
and Judith H. Steenblik,

MAY 15'^2 C

Plaintiffs, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants,

I-nv

Case

v.

Professional Manivest,

DENYING

PETITION FOR REHg^fc^

•

No.

910598-CA

Inc.,

a Utah corporation; Manivest
Corporation, a Utah
corporaiion,

Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing,

filed April 23,

1992,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
•////'

Dated this

BY

THE

/ / -"

day of May,

1992.

COURT:

Russell W.

Bench,

Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood*

Judge

I dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing at
this juncture.
I would call for a response.

GregoryynK.

Orme,

Judae

CERTIFICATE

OF

MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 14th day of May, 1991, a true and
correct copy cf the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to the parties
listed below:

Ronald E. Nehring
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
Attorneys at Law
175 East 400 South,

#900

Salt Lake City,

84111

Michael
Max

D.

R.

UT

Carlston

Wheller

Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.

O.

Box

3000

Salt Lake City,
Gerrit

M.

Jennings,

UT

84110

Steenblik

Strouss & Salmon

Attorneys at Law

One Renaissance Square
Two

North

Pheonix,

Central

Arizona

85004-2393

Dated this 14th day of May,

By

. • './
Deputy Clerk

1992.

_i—. - ,' ,..' • ~-u

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF "SALT LA7CE COUNTY
STATE

JOHN 0. HOWE, Trustee, et al.,

OF

UTAH

JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE AND
ORDER OF

POSSESSION

Plaintiffs,
vs.

PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST,

INC.,

a

Utah corporation, et al.,

Civil No. 880907595
/Z

<- cj ***•£./ <,. ..

Defendants.

The above-entitled cause came on regularly for trial

commencing March 6, 1990,
before The Honorable J.

and continuing through March 7, 1990,

Dennis Frederick.

Plaintiffs were

represented by Michael R. Carlston and Max D. Wheeler of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau,

and the defendants were represented by

Ronald E. Nehring and Brian S.

Geldzahler.

King of Prince,

Yeates &

The Court, having previously made and entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of the

plaintiffs, and wherefore, by virtue of the law and by reason of
the aforesaid,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
1.

ADJUDGED AND DECREED as

follows:

The lease (herein the "Lease") between the parties

affects the following described real property and all

improvements located thereon (collectively, the "Property") in
Salt Lake County, Utah,

to wit:

Parcel

1:

BEGINNING at a point on the South line of 5600 South Street, said
point being South 1340.07 feet and East 1589.02 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 0°14'30"
West 155 feet; thence North 89°49'35" West 31.07 feet; thence
South 66°00' West 433.52 feet; thence North 24°00' West 100.0
feet; thence South 66°00' West 35.0 feet; thence North 24°00'
West 100.0 feet; thence North 66°00' East 28.30 feet; thence
North 24°00'

Street;

West

167.50

feet

to the

South line of

5600

South

thence South 89°49'35" East 583.36 feet to the point of

BEGINNING.

Parcel

2:

BEGINNING at a point on the West line of 900 East Street, said
point being South 1957.25 feet and East 1711.42 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 66°00' West
461.39 feet, more or less; thence North 24°00' West 485.00 feet;
thence North 66°00' East 508.62 feet; thence South 89°49,35" East
156.07 feet to the West line of 900 East Street; thence South
0°14'30" West 461.81 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
Parcel

3:

BEGINNING at a point of the West line of 900 East Street, said
point being South 1957.25 feet and East 1711.42 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 0°14'30"
West along said West line 429.66 feet; thence West 200.50 feet;
thence North 0°14'30" East 275.69 feet; thence North 24°00' West
58.86 feet; thence North 66°00' East 246.39 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
Parcel

4:

BEGINNING at a point East 1025 feet and North 265 feet from the
West quarter corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 499.5
feet; thence North 0°14,30n East 275.69 feet; thence North 24°00'
West 58.86 feet; thence South 66°00' West 215.2 feet, more or
less; thence North 24°00' West 485.0 feet; thence North 66°00'
East 75.1 feet, more or less, to the Westerly line of Parcel 1
above; thence along said Westerly line of Parcel 1, North 24°00'
West 100 feet; thence South 66°00' West 35 feet; thence North
24°00' West 100 feet; thence North 66°00' East 28.3 feet; thence
North 24°00' West 167.5 feet to the South line of 5600 South

Street; thence along South line of 5600 South Street North
89°49'35" West 155 feet, more or less; thence South 03°19' West

192 23 feet, more or less; thence South 89°49T35" East 127.52
feet

more or less; thence South 24°00' East 677.76 feet, more or

less; thence South 85°51'30" West 229.12 feet; thence South
02°34' East 230 feet, more or less, to the point of BEGINNING.
Parcel

5:

Commencing at a point on the South line of 5600 South Street,

said point being South 1340.07 feet and East 1559.02 feet from
the Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1

East, salt Lake Base and Meridian, Salt Lake County, Utah, and
running thence South 0°14'30" West 155 feet; thence South
89049'35" East 155 feet to the West line of 900 East Street;
thence North 0°14'30" East along the West line of 900 East Street
155 feet to the intersection of the West line of 900 East Street
and the South line of 5600 South Street; thence North 89°49'35"
West 155 feet along the South line of 5600 South Street to the
point of commencement.

2.

The Lease was terminated effective June 1, 1988, and all

interest in said Lease was terminated on such date, and the
defendants have no further interest in the Lease or the Property.

3.

The plaintiffs are awarded immediate possession of the

Property.

4.

Defendants are ordered to immediately vacate the

Property in favor of plaintiffs, and plaintiffs are awarded all
rents and all other income from and after March 12, 1990, less

all necessary expenses incurred in management and operation of
the Property incurred prior to the time Judgment is entered.
5.

Plaintiffs are awarded liquidated damages for

defendants' continued use of the Property to March 12, 1990 in
the amount of $24,489.50, together with prejudgment interest as
allowed by law.

f

-• •

r- f

: -

6.

Defendants' Counterclaim against plaintiffs and each

count thereof is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

7.

Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees and costs in an

amount to be established by a supplemental judgment,
DATED

this \tfkkLay of

May,

1990.

BY THE

COURT:

mMji

The tfoAor'ab/e/ J/. Dennis Frederick

Third jbist^ijct./Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

PRINCE,

By

YEATES & GELDZAHLER

^^Udhit
Ronald E.

Nehring

Attorneys for Defendants

:N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU^T--oVrS^^Tt"£A^E ^(fcCUNTY
STATE

JOHN O. HOWE,

Trustee,

OF

et al.,

UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs .

PROFESSIONAL

MANIVEST,

Utah corporation,

INC.,

a

et al. ,

Civil

No.

880907595

Defendants.
rv

-

.

-

t->

This case came on regularly for trial before the Court on

March 6, 1990, and again on March 7, 1990.

Plaintiffs, John 0.

Howe, Trustee, Robert Howe, Bill Evans and Carole Evans were

present and all plaintiffs were represented by their counsel,
Michael R.

Martineau.

Carlston and Max D. Wheeler of Snow,

Christensen h

The defendants were present and represented by their

counsel, Ronald E. Nehring and Brian S. King of Prince, Yeates k
Geldzahler.

Witnesses were sworn.

Testimony and other evidence

was considered and received into evidence by the Court.

At the

conclusion of the evidence, pursuant to the stipulation of the

parties, oral argument was waived and the parties agreed to
submit written summaries of their respective positions.
summaries were presented by the parties on March 9, 1990.

such

The Court, having considered the summaries, the sworn

testimony of the witnesses and the other evidence presented, now
makes

and enters

its:
FINDINGS

1.

OF

FACT

Plaintiffs, John 0. Howe, Trustee; Robert E. Howe and

Bonnie F. Howe, husband and wife; William K. Evans and Carole H.

Evans, husband and wife, and Judith H. Steenblik, are the
successors-in-interest to John 0. Howe, Maxine Howe, Earl Howe

and Vivian Howe, as Lessors under a Lease and Option dated
October 14, 1960 (the "Lease").

2.

Defendants are the successors-in-interest to the Lessees

under the

3.

Lease.

The Lease contained an option to purchase the real

property subject to the Lease.

Pursuant to the terms of the

option, certain portions of the real property which was subject

to the Lease, were purchased and from thenceforth no longer
subject to the Lease.

4.

The option in the Lease expired in October 1975, leaving

the below described real property and all of the improvements

then cr thereafter located thereon (collectively the "Property")
subject to the Lease,
Parcel

to wit:

1:

BEGINNING at a point on the South line of 5600 South Street, said
point being South 1340.07 feet and East 1589.02 feet from the

Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 0°14'30"
West 155 feet; thence North 89°49'35" West 31.07 feet; thence
-2-

BEGINNING.
Parcel

2:

BEGINNING at a point on the West line of 900 East Street said

point being South 1957.25 feet and East 1711.42 feet from .he
*?s£;
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence SouthJ6°C0 West

Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South.Range

461 39 feet more or less; thence North 24°00< west 485.OC feet;
thence North 66°00' East 508.62 feet; thence south 89^49',5 East
1*6 07 feet to the West line of 900 East Street; thence so.tn
0°14'30" West 461.81 feet to the point of BEGINNING.
Parcel

3:

BEGINNING at a point of the West line of 900 East street said

point being South 1957.25 feet and East 1711.42 feet from he

Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South

Range

_Eas.,

Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence s°u^ °»l- 3o

West along said West line 429.66 feet; thence West 200 5C' ^et,
thence North 0°14'30" East 275.69 feet; thence North 24°0- West
58.86 feet; thence North 66=00' East 246.39 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.

Parcel

4:

BEGINNING at a point East 1025 feet and North 265 feet from the
wes:. quarter corner of Section 17, Township 2 South Range .
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence Eas 499
feet: thence North 0°14'30" East 275.69 feet; thence North 24°00
west 58.66 feet; thence South 66=00' West 215.2 feet

more or

less; thence North 24°00' West 485.0 feet; thence No th
0
East 75.1 feet, more or less, to the westerly line of Par-el 1
above; thence along said Westerly line of Parcel 1 Nor. 24 00
west 100 feet- thence South 66°00' West 35 feet; thence No. n
24°00 West 100 feet; thence North 66°00' East 28.3 feet; thence
No-th 24°00' West 167.5 feet to the South line of 5600 S.ith
Stree- thence along South line of 5600 South Street Nor n

90^:35' west 155 feet, more or less; thence South 030 -' West

19? 23 feet more or less; thence South 89°49'35" East 1.7.52
t more or
s thence South 24o00' East 677 76 feet more or

less thence South 85°5r30" West 229.12 feet; thence South
02°34' East 230 feet, more or less, to the point of BE^.<N.W
-3-

Parcel

5:

Commencing at a point on the south line of 5600 South Street,
said point being South 1340.07 feet and East 1559.02 feet from

the Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Salt Lake County, Utah, and
running thence South 0°14'30" West 155 feet; thence South

89°49,35" East 155 feet to the West line of 900 East Street;
thence North 0°14'30" East along the West line of 900 East Street
155 feet to the intersection of the West line of 900 East Street
and the South line of 5600 South Street; thence North 89°49'35'T
West 155 feet along the South line of 5600 South Street to the
point of commencement,

5.

In September, 1983, defendants, without the plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent, permitted encroachments on to the Property.
Exhibit

6.

"10".

In May of 1978, defendants, without the plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent, executed, delivered and recorded a Trust
Deed on the Property and an assignment of the Lease and of all
tenant subleases in favor of First Security Bank.

7.

Exhibit "11".

In 1982, defendants, without the plaintiffs' knowledge

or consent, assigned the Lease and all tenant subleases to Valley
Bank Sl Trust ("Valley Bank").

8.

Exhibits "12", "13" and "14".

In December of 1987, without the plaintiffs' knowledge

or consent, defendants assigned the Lease and all of the tenant

subleases to Valley Bank in connection with a $4,000,000 loan.
Exhibit

9.

"17".

In January of 1988, defendants, without the plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent, executed, delivered and recorded a Trust

-4-

Deed on the Property and an Assignment of the Lease in favor of
Valley Bank.

10.

Exhibits "17" and "18".

In January of 1988, pursuant to the terms and

conditions of the 1987-88 Valley Bank loan, Larry Leeper en

behalf of the defendants solicited the plaintiffs' consent to the

1987-88 Valley Bank loan.

This request was made following the

execution, delivery and recording by the defendants of a Trust

Deed on the Property and an Assignment of the Lease in favor of

Valley Bank and following the assignment of all tenant subleases
to Valley Bank.

Intentionally, or otherwise, the acknowledgement

submitted to the plaintiffs included language intended to cause

the plaintiffs' interest to be subordinated to the 1987-88 Valley
Bank loan.

Exhibits "8", "17", "18" and "19".

The action of the

defendants in making this request in the form proposed
constituted something less than good faith and fair dealing.

11.

By letter dated March 30, 1988, the plaintiffs put the

defendants on notice that defendants were in default of covenants

and obligations under the Lease, and plaintiffs requested removal
of the aforementioned assignments to and encumbrances in favor of

Valley Bank and correction of the improper condition of the
Property.

12.

Exhibit "30".

The defendants received the March 30, 1988 notice and

did not take action to remedy the defaults as requested.

-5-

13.

The defendants also received an April 29, 1989 notice

from plaintiffs, as indicated in Exhibit "30", and still did
nothing to remedy the defaults.

14.

Defendants' failure to remedy the continuing defaults

after receipt cf the March 30, 1988 and April 29, 1988 Notices
precipitated the service by plaintiffs of a Notice of Termination
dated May 31, 1988.

15.
1,

Exhibit "31".

Defendants received the Notice of Termination on June

1988.

16.

Defendants made no affirmative response to plaintiffs'

demands regarding the condition of the Property until late July
of

1988.

17.

Exhibits "28" and "32".

Defendants made no affirmative response to plaintiffs'

request that the Valley Bank assignments and encumbrances be

removed until September 1 and September 22, 1988, some five

months following the plaintiffs' request, when certain of the
encumbrances were released.
18.

At

Exhibit "33".

the time of trial,

all of the tenant subleases had

been purportedly assigned to Valley Bank.
19.

Defendants, on three separate occasions, entered into

agreements called Purchase and Sale Agreements without the

knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs.
purported to sell the defendants'

These agreements

interest to MD Investments

Limited Partnership on February 1, 1976; from MD Investments

-6-

Limited Partnership to Westco Realty, Inc. on January 1, 1978;
and from Westco Realty, Inc. to Diversified Realty Limited
Partnership on January 1,

20.

1978.

Exhibit "22".

On or about April 28, 1988, without plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent, defendants assigned their interest m the
Lease to a liquidating trust.

Exhibits M21" and "40".

The

Liquidating Trust was expressly established to liquidate all
assets, including the Soutnlake Shopping Center situated on the
Property,

21.

for the benefit of creditors.

Defendants received two separate notices of viciation

of Murray City ordinances on April 21, 1983, as evidenced by
Exhibit "23", and on July 10, 1989, as evidenced by Exhibit "37".

These notices pertain to improper conditions of the Property with
respect to the weeds, debris and other environmental matters
associated with the Property.

22.

Said improper conditions on the Property continued

after the aforementioned notices from Murray City,

or were

allowed to reoccur on multiple occasions, including after

plaintiffs served notice of intent to terminate the Lease.
Exhibits

23.

"26"

and

"28".

Defendants, directly or through their tenants, allowed

health and safety violations to occur and continue on the

Property through the present, including, but not limited to,
electrical violations, disrepair of the parking lot, exposed

-7-

mechanical equipment, sagging roof, improperly supported gas
line, loose debris on the roof, broken windows, water

accumulating by electrical lines and excess water accumulation,

and exterior electrical outlets not waterproofed, as evidenced by
the testimony of Architects Robert P. Leonard and Judge Hawks.
Exhibit

"39" .

24. Underground storage tanks located on a portion of the
Property, whLch has been subleased by defendants, have not been
registered as required by law.

25. All of the foregoing facts represent lease violations,
with the principal violations pertaining to paragraphs 4, 5 and 6
of the Lease. These violations, separately and together, were
material breaches of the Lease and were of a substantial nature.

These breaches of the Lease, particularly the breaches regarding
assignments, encumbrances and other related lease terms were and

are of such primary importance to the plaintiffs, that plaintiffs
would not have entered into the Lease had they been aware
defendants would breach these terms.

26. Conflicting evidence was offered pertaining to the
value of the defendants's leasehold estate. The most credible

and believable evidenced was provided by witness Charles Huber,
CP.A. and Exhibit "42". This evidence establishes that the
current value of the defendants' leasehold estate is between
$500,000 and $600,000. The Lease expressly provides for a

-8-

forfeiture cf the Property, including, but not limited to the
improvements, at the end of the term or upon the earlier
expiration of the Lease by reason of default.
27. Taking into account that the provisions of the Lease

are to be strictly construed against the parties seeking
forfeiture and considering all of the facts and circumstances

according to the applicable standard of proof, including, hut not
limited to, the materiality of the defendants' defaults, the harm
caused to plaintiffs by defendants' defaults, the value of the
defendants' leasehold estate, the fair market value of the

Property and the reasonable rental value thereof, the willful and
persistent nature of the defendants' defaults, the defendants'
failure to respond to the notice of default, the fact that the
Lease itself contemplates forfeiture and that the Lessor will
succeed to the ownership of the improvements, and the defendants'
conduct m seeking the plaintiffs' consent to the 1987-68 Valley
Bank loan, this court is persuaded that the value of the
defendants' leasehold estate is not so excessive as to be
entirely disproportionate to any loss that might have beer.

contemplated. Such aresult does not shock the conscience of the
Court and is not unconscionable.

28.

Plaintiffs' Notice of Termination, Exhibit "31"

complies with the terms of the Lease insofar as required m order
to forfeit the defendants' interest in the Lease.

-9-

29.

Although defendants asserted as a counterclaim that

Plaintiffs breached their duty of fair dealing, defendants
provided no credible evidence in support of this counterclaim.
30.

Although defendants asserted as a counterclaim that

Plaintiffs had a duty to consent to the assignment of the Lease
to Valley Bank for the 1987-88 loan arrangement, defendants
provided no credible evidence in support of this counterclaim.
31.

The Lease provides under certain circumstances for the

awarding of expenses and attorneys' fees, and this action falls

within the terms of the Lease requiring the award to plaintiffs
of attorneys' fees and costs for bringing this action.

The Court, having made its findings of fact, now makes and
enters

its:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Defendants have defaulted on their covenants and

obligations under the Lease.

2. The defendants' defaults set forth in the foregoing
Findings of Fact are material, in that the plaintiffs would not
have entered into the Lease unless the provisions which the
defendants violated had been included m the Lease.
3.

The Lease expressly provides for forfeiture of the

defendants' leasehold estate upon default.

10-

4. Plaintiffs have complied with all conditions required by

the Lease and by law in order to forfeit all of the right, title
and interest of defendants in the Lease.

5. Ail interest of the defendants as the owners of the of
the Lessee's interest in the Lease was forfeited effective ;une

!, 1988, and defendants' possession of the Property should be
terminated.

6. Taking into account that the provisions of the Lease are

to be strictly construed against the parties seeking forfeiture
and considering all of the facts and circumstances according to

•he applicable standard of proof, including, but not limited to,
the materiality of the defendants' defaults, the value cf the
defendants' leasehold estate, the fair market value of tr.e

Property and the reasonable value thereof, the harm caused to the
pla<r*i<fs by the defendants' defaults, the willful and
Persistent nature of the defendants' defaults, the defendants'
failure to timely respond to notice of default, that the Lease

itsel£ contemplates aforfeiture with the Lessor succeeding to
^e movements and the defendants' conduct in seeking the

plaintiffs' consent to the 1987-88 Valley Bank loan arrangement
on adocument which, if signed, would have amended material terms
of the Lease and may have subordinated plaintiffs' fee interest
m the Property to the Valley Bank loan, the value of the
defendants' leasehold estate is not such that forfeiture is so
-11-

excessive as to be entirely disproportionate to any loss that
might have been contemplated.

Such a result does not shock the

conscience of the Court and is not unconscionable.

There is no

reason that the contractual result agreed and contemplated by the
parties should be prevented from occurring.
7.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to have forfeited to

them all of the defendants' interest of whatever kind or nature,
including, but not limited to, defendants' interest in the Lease,
the Property and all improvements thereon.
8.

The defendants'

leasehold estate and the Lease should be

forfeited and terminated as of the effective date of the

forfeiture notice, to wit:
9.

The plaintiffs

June 1, 1988.

are entitled to all rents

and other

income attributable from the Property from March 12, 1990
forward.

10.

Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages for the

defendants'

continued use of the Property to March 12, 1990 in

the amount of S24,489.50, together with prejudgment interest as
allowed by law.

11.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment of forfeiture and

an order granting immediate possession of the Property.
12.

Plaintiffs

are entitled to an award of

-12-

their reasonable

attorneys'

fees and expenses as provided by contract,

such

amounts to be determined by the Court.
DATED

day of May,

this

1990.

BY THE CpURT:

The /'Hdriora

J.

Dfinnis

Frederick

Th,iriv Di^XJ^ct// Court Judge

APPROVED

PRINCE,

AS

TO

YEATES

FORM:

& GELDZAHLER

Ronald E. Nehring
Brian S. King

Attorneys for Defendants
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1

MONDAY, MARCH 12. 1990

3

THE COURT:

THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR RULING IN

4

THE MATTER OF JOHN O. HOWE, ETC., VERSES PROFESSIONAL

5

MANIVEST, INC., ETC., CASE #C-88-7595.

6

PRKSENT.

7

I NOTE COUNSEL ARE

AT THI-: CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL IN THIS MATTER,

0

THIS COURT TOOK UNDER ADVISEMENT ITS RULING TO ENABLE ME

9

Til!': nnmii-K OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE the EXHIBITS that wfrf

in

KFCKIVKD, PI.LADINGS AND THE TESTIMONY ELICITED.

THIS COURT

11

HAS NOW DONE SO.

12

RKVIK.WKD THE RESHKCTIVK MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED HY MOTH SIDES

13

BEARING UPON THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE, WHICH WERE SUBMITTED

14

IN LIEU OF CLOSING ARGUMENT.

AND MOREOVER, I HAVE RECEIVED AND

15

PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION SEEK A DETERMINATION

16

UNDER DEFENDANT'S BREACH IN VARIOUS PARTICULARS: THE LEASE

17

AND OPTION AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, 1960, EXHIBIT 1,

18

BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND/OR THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST.

19

PLAINTIFFS SEEK IN ADDITION A DETERMINATION THAT THE

20

APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SUCH BREACHES IS FORFEITURE OF THE

21

DEFENDANT'S LEASEHOLD INTEREST.

22

FALL GENERALLY INTO THREE CATEGORIES.

23

NO. 1:

THESE ALLEGED BREACHES

BREACH OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF EXHIBIT 1,

24

WHEREIN IT IS PROVIDED THAT THIS LEASE SHALL BE

25

UNASSIGNABLE, EXCEPT WITH PRIOR CONSENT OF THE LESSORS BY
: J

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

FyVjjRlT "D '

1

DEFENDANTS

ASSIGNING

2

NO.

3

WHICH

STATES,

4

PREMISES

5

ANY

2:

BREACH OF PARAGRAPH 6

AND CLEAR OF ALL

NO.

3:

7

"WHEREIN

THE

LESSEE

8

PREMISES

AND

KEEP

9

GROWTH,

LIENS

AND

BREACH OF

PARAGRAPH

AGREED

TO

MAINTAINED

FREE

FROM

IT

WEEDS

AND NOT PERFORM ANY ACT

10

ORDINANCES

OR

11

OF

THE

OR

12

REGULATIONS
UNITED

THE

IF

INTEREST.

OF

CLAIM

14

AND NCNMATERIAL ONLY,

15

PLAINTIFFS.

THE

16

BREACHED THE

LEASE

17

PERMISSION

18

INTEREST,

19

IMPLIED

FOR

AND

THE

WHICH

WAY

22

STRICTLY

23

MOON

24

CONSTRUCTORS,

25

DECISION,

RESULTING

COURT

OUR

CONSTRUED

ELECTRIC

767

1980,

FAIR

OF

COURTS

VIEW

THOSE

A

1,

NOXIOUS

LAWS

OF THE

BREACHES,

STATE

CLAIM THAT

AND

JUST

PLAINTIFFS

CAUSE

TO GRANT

LEASEHOLD

BREACHED THEIR
GOOD

OF

FAITH.

THE

SEEKING

VERSES

UTAH

AND RUSSEL VS.

BUT

WERE TECHNICAL

DISFAVOR

FORFEITURE AND THEY

ASSOCIATION

P2D 125,

OTHER

THEY

DEFENDANT'S

COGNIZANT

AGAINST

DEMISED

ALLEGED

WITHOUT

DEALING

IS

THE

CITY,

FURTHER THAT PLAINTIFFS
OF

EXHIBIT

IN NO DAMAGE TO THE

FURTHER

REFUSING

ASSIGNMENT

THIS

21

BY

5 OF

GOVERNMENT."

DENY

DEFENDANTS

COVENANT

LAKE

1,

ENCUMBRANCES OF

AND

INDEED THE BREACHES OCCURRED,

THE

EXHIBIT

IN VIOLATION OF THE

MURRAY

STATES

DEFENDANTS

13

20

OF

WHATSOEVER."

6

UTAH

LEASEHOLD

"LESSEE SHALL AGREE TO KEEP THE DEMISE

FREE

NATURE

ITS

SUCH

ULTRA

WITH

ARE

TO

BE

REMEDY."

SYSTEMS

WESTERN

COURT OF APPEALS

PARK CITY

UTAH CORPORATION,
,o.

CREED

H.

BARKER,

CSR

1

548 P2D 889, A 1976 CASE.

2

FREE TO CONTRACT ACCORDING TO THEIR DESIRES

3

TERMS THEY CAN AGREE UPON.

4

SHOULD BE

5

RESULT

6

REFUSE TO ENFORCE IT."

7

1954 CASE AND PERKINS VS.

AND

IN WHATEVER

FURTHER THAT THE CONTRACT

ENFORCED ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS

UNLESS THAT

IS SO UNCONSCIONABLE THAT A COURT OF EQUITY WOULD

8

9

"BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE PARTIES ARE

JACOBSON VS.

"A PARTIES'

LIGHTLY

SPENCER,

278 P2D 294,

243 P2D 446,

AS

11

EXCESSIVE TO BE

12

LOSS THAT MIGHT HAVE

13

SHOCK THE CONSCIENCE OF A COURT OF EQUITY.

IT HAS

14

HELD THAT AS

IT

15

BE GRANTED WITHOUT A

16

DEFINED

17

WOULD

18

CONTEMPLATED.

19

449,

1979.

20

THIS

COURT'S

NOT

21

AS

ONE OF

BE

BY

THE

FACTS

WOULD

MADE

BEEN

SO GROSSLY

RESCISSION

IF

IS

CONCERNED

MATERIAL BREACH,

SUCH

PRIME

WHICH

IMPORTANCE THAT

DEFAULT

IN

THAT

1:

THE

IT,

WOULD

BEEN

SHOULD NOT

HAS
THE

BEEN
CONTRACT

PARTICULAR

HAD

BEEN

STEVEN HOLCOMB,
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P2D

IN THIS CASE THE EVIDENCE HAS
SATISFACTION

POSSIBLE

CONTEMPLATED TO ENFORCE

POLYGLYCOAT VS.

NO.

BE

ENTIRELY DISPROPORTIONATE TO ANY

FAR

BE

IT IS ONLY WHEN THE FORFEITURE

10

AS

DEMONSTRATED

A

1952.

RIGHT TO CONTRACT SHOULD NOT

INTERFERED WITH.

CLEARLY

SWAN,

ESTABLISHED TO

FOLLOWING:

THE DEFENDANT'S

CONVEYED BY

22

DEED TO WALBY ENTERPRISES SEPTEMBER 1,

1983,

23

LAND,

24

DIMENSION,

25

PLAINTIFFS AS REPRESENTED BY EXHIBIT 10.

QUITCLAIM

A STRIP OF

PART OF THE LEASE PREMISES OF 677 FEET BY 244 FEET IN
WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR THE CONSENT OF THE

CREED

H.

BARKER,

CSR

THE QUITCLAIM

1

DEED CONTAINED WITHIN EXHIBIT 10 WAS RECEIVED BY

2

STIPULATION OF COUNSEL.

3

NO. 2:

THE DEFENDANTS ASSIGNED TO VALLEY BANK

4

AND TRUST ITS INTEREST, THEIR INTEREST IN THE LEASE ON MAY

5

21, 1982, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR THE CONSENT OF THE

6

PLAINTIFFS, EXHIHITS 12 AND 13.

7

NO. 3:

THE DEFENDANTS ASSIGNED AND EXECUTED A

fl

TRUST DEED TN FAVOR OF FIRST SECURITY BANK, THEIR INTEREST

9

IN THE LEASE ON MAY 18, 1978, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR

10

CONSENT OF THE DEFENDANTS.

j]

NO. 4:

EXHIBIT 11.

THE DEFENDANTS ASSIGNED AND GRANTED A

12

TRUST DEED TO VALLEY HANK AND TRUST, THEIR INTEREST IN THE

13

LEASE ON DECEMBER 8, 1987, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT

14

OF THE PLAINTIFFS, EXHIBITS 17 AND 18.

15

NO. 5:

WHEN DEFENDANTS AGENT LEAPER (SIC)

16

SOUGHT RATIFICATION AND APPROVAL FROM THE PLAINTIFFS ON

17

JANUARY 22ND, 1988, HE FAILED INTENTIONALLY OR OTHERWISE TO

18

ADVISE THE PLAINTIFFS THE LANGUAGE OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

19

OF ASSIGNMENT HE SOUGHT PLAINTIFF'S APPROVAL OF, HAD BEEN

20

MODIFIED TO INCLUDE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT NOT REQUESTED BY THE

21

BANK; THAT THE PLAINTIFFS AGREED THE ASSIGNMENT WAS QUOTE:

22

"ENCUMBERING THEIR INTEREST", UNQUOTE.

23

19.

24
25

EXHIBITS 8, 17 AND

THIS CONDUCT CONSTITUTED SOMETHING LESS THAN
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.

THE PLAINTIFFS OBJECTED AND
0*3!

0^CREED H.

BARKER,

CSR

1

DEMANDED THE ASSIGNMENT AND TRUST DEED WERE IN VIOLATION OF

2

THE LEASE BY LETTER OF MARCH 30, 1988, EXHIBIT 30.

3

CONVEYANCE OF THE TRUST DEED AND THE RELEASE OF ASSIGNMENT

4

WERE NOT OBTAINED UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1 OF '88, ON SEPTEMSER

5

22ND OF '88, RESPECTIVELY.

6

YET THE

EXHIBIT 33.

SOME FIVE MONTHS AFTER PLAINTIFFS CONSIDERED

7

SUCH ACTION VIOLATIVE OF THE LEASE TERMS, TO THIS DATE

8

TENANT LEASES ARE STILL ASSIGNED.

9

NO. 6:

DEFENDANTS EXECUTED THREE SEPARATE

10

PURCHASE AND SELL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AND AMONG NATIONAL

11

REALTY LIMITED TO M.D. INVESTMENTS LIMITED FEBRUARY 1,

12

1976; M.D. INVESTMENTS TO WESTCO REALTY INC., JANUARY 1,

13

1978; AND WESTCO REALTY INC. TO DIVERSIFIED REALTY, LIMITED

14

JANUARY 1, 1978, PURPORTING TO SELL DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN

15

THE LEASEHOLD PROPERTY WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT OF

16

THE PLAINTIFFS.

17

EXHIBIT 22.

NO. 7:

THE DEFENDANTS ASSIGNED THEIR INTEREST

38

IN THE LEASE TO THE MANIVEST, MANIVEST LIQUIDATING TRUST,

19

APRIL 28, 1988, WITHOUT THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OR KNOWLEDGE OR

20

CONSENT OF PLAINTIFFS.

21

EXHIBITS 21 AND 40.

PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED TWO NOTICES IN VIOLATION OF

22

THE MURRAY CITY ORDINANCES, OR NOTICES OF VIOLATION OF

23

MURRAY CITY ORDINANCES APRIL 21, 1983, WHICH IS EXHIBIT 23,

24

AND JULY 10, 1989, WHICH IS 20 AND 34, FOR THE DEFENDANTS

25

HAVING ALLOWED WEEDS AND WASTE MATERIAL TO ACCUMULATE ON
/->

P

CREED H.

BARKER,

CSR

^

6

1

THE PROPERTY, WHICH CONDITIONS CONTINUED OR WERE ALLOWED TO

2

OCCUR AGAIN EVEN AFTER THE TERMINATION EFFORT OF THE LEASE

3

NOTICE OF MAY 31, 1988, AND APPEAR IN EXHIBITS 28 AND 26.

4

DEFENDANTS, CONTRARY TO TERMS, PARAGRAPH 5 OF

5

THE LEASE, ALLOWED EITHER THEMSELVES OR THROUGH THEIR

6

TENANTS, CONDITIONS IN VIOLATION OF PERTINENT HEALTH AND

7

SAFETY CODES OR REGULATIONS TO EXIST.

8

ELECTRICAL OUTLETS WITHOUT COVERS, EXPOSED MECHANICAL

9

EQUIPMENT, EXTFRTOR ELECTRICAL OUTLETS NOT WATERPROOF,

EXAMPLES:

If)

SAOGING ROOF, IMPROPER SUPPORT OF GAS LINE, LOOSE DEBRIS ON

11

THE ROOF, DISREPAIR OF THE PARKING LOT, BROKEN WINDOW,

12

EXCESSIVE WATER ACCUMULATION ALLOWING FREEZING POTENTIAL.

13

EXHIBIT 39.

14

TESTIMONY OF THE ARCHITECTS, JUD HAWKS AND ROBERT LEONARD.

15

THE DEFENDANTS ALSO FAILED TO REGISTER WITH THE STATE OF

16

UTAH THE UNDERGROUND GAS STORAGE TANKS.

17

AND THIS IS SUPPORTED BY EXHIBIT 39 AND THE

DEFENDANTS WERE GIVEN NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S

18

POSITION REGARDING THE DEFAULTS ON OR ABOUT MARCH 30, 1988

19

-- EXHIBIT 30 -- WHEN IT CAME TO PLAINTIFF'S ATTENTION.

20

CERTAINLY THOUGH BY NO MEANS ALL OF THE ASSIGNMENTS HAD

21

TAKEN PLACE, YET THE DEFENDANTS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED A

22

NO VIOLATION POSTURE, RATHER THAN ADDRESS THE DEFAULTS.

23

FURTHER NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO DEFENDANTS ON APRIL

24

29, 1988 —

EXHIBIT 30 -- GIVEN DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO

25

REMEDY THE SITUATION.

PLAINTIFFS SERVED THE NOTICE OF
f- <-

CREED H.

BARKER,

CSR

.wl

1

TERMINATION.

EXHIBIT 31.

2

THE FOREGOING RECITATION OF FACTS PROVED IN THIS

3

CASE IN THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT REPRESENTS VIOLATIONS OF THE

4

LEASE TERMS, IN PARTICULAR PARAGRAPHS 4, 5 AND 6:

5

CUMULATIVE EFFECT AND CAUSE OF THE COURSE OF CONDUCT BY THE

6

DEFENDANTS, REPRESENTS IN THIS COURT'S VIEW A MATERIAL

7

BREACH OF SUCH A SUBSTANTIAL NATURE THAT THIS COURT IS

8

PERSUADED THE REMEDY SOUGHT IS APPROPRIATE.

9

PERSUADED THAT THE BREACHED TERMS, PARTICULARLY THOSE

THE

THIS COURT IS

10

PROHIBITING ASSIGNMENTS, ENCUMBRANCES AND LEASES ARE OF

11

SUCH PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO THE PLAINTIFFS THEY WOULD HAVE

12

NOT ENTERED TNTO THE LEASE HAD THEY BEEN AWARE DEFENDANTS

13

WOULD VIOLATE SAID TERMS.

14

THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE PRESENT ADJUSTED

15

VALUE OF THE LEASEHOLD IS BETWEEN 500 AND $600,000,

16

PURSUANT TO EXHIBIT 42, AND THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS.

17

THIS IS THE MORE BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE.

18

CONTEMPLATES THAT AT THE EXPIRATION OF ITS TERM THE

19

FORFEITURE OF THE REVERSIONARY INTEREST AND IMPROVEMENTS

20

WOULD OCCUR.

21

OFFSETTING VALUE TO THE PRESENT VALUE OF THE LEASEHOLD.

22

GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS COURT'S VIEW IS THE

23

FORFEITURE IS NOT SO GROSSLY EXCESSIVE AS TO BE ENTIRELY

24

DISPROPORTIONATE TO ANY LOSS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

25

CONTEMPLATED.

THE LEASE

THIS VALUE, WHATEVER IT MAY BE, IS AN

CREED H.

BARKER,

CSR

^j

1

THIS COURT IS MOREOVER OF THE VIEW THAT THE

2

PLAINTIFF'S LETTER OF TERMINATION DATED MAY 31, 1988 —

3

EXHIBIT 31 — COMPLIED WITH THE TERMS OF THE LEASE AND WAS

4

EFFECTIVE. DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IS ACCORDINGLY TERMINATED

5

OR FORFEITED AS OF MAY 31, 1988.

f,

BY THE DEFENDANTS ARE TO BE RETAINED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AS

7

FAIR RENTAL LIQUIDATED DAMAGE VALUE FOR THE DEFENDANTS

8

CONTINUED OCCUPANCY SINCE THE DATE OF FORFEITURE.

9

ALL SUMS PAID THEREAFTER

NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN ELICITED TO

10

SUPPORT THE COUNTERCLAIM THAT THE PLAINTIFFS BREACHED ANY

11

OBLIGATION OF FAIR DEALING AND GOOD FAITH, OR THAT THE

12

PLAINTIFFS ARBITRARILY WITHOUT JUST CAUSE REFUSED TO EXCEED

13

TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ANY ASSIGNMENTS;

14

ACCORDINGLY, THIS COURT FINDS NO CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE

15

COUNTER CLAIM.

16

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS FOR THE NECESSITY OF BRINGING THIS

17

ACTION.

18

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT OF

19

FORFEITURE AND TO SUBMIT BY AFFIDAVIT THEIR CLAIM FOR

20

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO RULE 4501.

21
22

THE PLAINTIFFS ARE GRANTED REASONABLE

COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS ARE TO PREPARE THE

COUNSEL, ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

VERY WELL,

THIS COURT WILL BE IN RECESS.

23

24

25

CREED H. BARKER, CSR
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor

Deputy CierK

Post Office Box 45000

Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

Telephone:

(801) 521-9000
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STEENBLIK

JENNINGS STROUSS & SALMON
One Renaissance Square
Two North Central

Phoenix, Arizona 85004-2393

Telephone:

(602) 262-5911
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAK^ COUNTY

n/
STATE OF UTAH

^

JOHN O. HOWE, Trustee, ROBERT
E. HOWE and BONNIE F. HOWE,
husband and wife; WILLIAM K.
EVANS and CAROLE H. EVANS,
husband and wife, as Trustee;
and JUDITH H. STEENBLIK,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

:ivii no. ^c-'u.n

vs .

PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST INC.,

a

Utah corporation; PROFESSIONAL
MANIVEST,

INC.,

f h 'J

;

t • -

,

a Utah

corporation, as Trustee;
MANIVEST CORPORATION,

a Utah

corporation and JOHN DOES 1
through 10,
Defendants.

000002

Plaintiffs complain of defendants and allege as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1.

Plaintiff, John 0. Howe is the Trustee of the John O.

Howe and Maxine Howe Family Trust of June 6, 1988, and is a
resident of Washington County, Utah.
2.

Plaintiffs, William K. Evans and Carole H. Evans are

husband and wife, are residents of Salt Lake County, Utah, and
are the Trustees of the William K. Evans and Carole H. Evans

Family Trust of August 12, 1985.
3.

Plaintiffs, Robert E. Howe and Bonnie F. Howe are

husband and wife and are residents of Contra Cosa County,
California.

4.

Plaintiff, Judith H. Steenblik is a married woman

dealing with her sole and separate property and is a resident
of Maricopa County, Arizona.

5.

All of the aforementioned parties described in para

graphs 1 through 4, either individually or as Trustees, are

hereinafter referred to collectively as plaintiffs.
6.

Upon information and belief. Professional Manivest,

Inc. and Manivest Corporation (hereinafter referred to as

defendants) are corporations organized for profit under the

laws of the State of Utah, having their principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
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7.

Defendants John Does 1 through 10 are individuals or

entities who, as a result of dealings with Professional
Manivest Inc., Manivest Corporation, or others, may claim see
interest cr right in the Lease or Premises which is the subject
of this action. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this
Complaint by adding the actual names of said John Does 1

through 10 as soon as the same are ascertained. Professional
Manivest Inc. and Manivest Corporation, whether individually or
as trustee, and John Does 1 through 10 are referred to herein
collectively as defendants.

8.

Plaintiffs are the owners of the fee simple interest

in certain improved and unimproved real property located at the
southwest corner of 5600 South and 900 East in Salt Lake

County, Utah, the legal description of which is set forth in
the attached Exhibit "A" which is incorporated herein ty

reference.

Said real property is hereinafter called tne

"Premises".

9.

Plaintiffs are the current Lessors under that certain

Lease and Option Agreement dated October 15, i960, between Earl
E. Howe and Vivian J. Howe, husband and wife, and J;hr. 0. Howe
and Maxine Howe, husband and wife, as Lessors, ana ^.

Lehnherr, Herman L. Franks and Stanford L. Hale, co-partners

doing business as Valley Shopping Center, as Lessees 'the
"Lease"), which originally demised certain real property which

- j -
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included but: was

not

limited to the Premises

recorded on October 31,

1960,

in Book 1754,

official records of Salt Lake County,

Utah,

and which was

Pages 25-32,

of the

A true and accur

ate ccpy of the Lease is attached as Exhibit "B" and incorpor
ated herein by reference.

At all pertinent times prior to June 1,

1988, the Premises

were subject to the Lease.

10.

Upon information and belief, defendants either indivi

dually or as. trustee, claim to be the holder of Lessee's
interest uncer

the Lease or

interest under

the Lease.

11.

claim some

interest

in Lessee's

Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease,

ing but not limited to paragraph 4 of the Lease,

includ

defendants

covenanted and agreed not to assign the Lease except with the
prior consent of the Lessors.

12.

Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease,

ing but not

limited to paragraph 5 of the Lease,

includ

defendants

covenanted and agreed to maintain and keep the entire Premises

in good condition and repair during the term of the Lease.
13.

Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease,

ing but not limited to paragraph 5 of the Lease,

includ

defendants

covenanted and agreed to keep the entire Premises free from
weeds and other obnoxious growth during the term of the Lease.

-4-
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14.

Except as was otherwise set forth in paragraph 14 cf

the Lease, pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease, includ
ing but not limited to paragraph 6 cf the Lease, defendants
covenanted and agreed to keep the Premises free and clear of
all liens and encumbrances of any nature whatsoever.

15.

Plaintiffs and their predecessors have fully dis

charged and satisfied all of their cbligations under the Lease,
including, but not limited to the obligations pursuant to

paragraph 14 of the Lease to allow financing for the original
construction of improvements on the Premises, and at no per
tinent time have defendants had any further rights pursuant to
paragraph 14 of the Lease.

16.

Pursuant to relevant provisions of the Lease, includ

ing but not limited to paragraph 9 cf the Lease, in the event
that defendants failed to perform any of their covenants or

obligations under the Lease for a period of 60 days, plaintiffs
were entitled to terminate the Lease,

and Defendants were

obligated to surrender the Premises to plaintiffs.
17.

The parties, as indicated in the manner in which the

Lease is structured and as indicated by the Lease term/; agreed
in effect that if it were necessary to make material

a-diticnal

improvements to the Premises or if unforeseen or uncontemplated

conditions required additional financing of the Premises,

then

the parties would be required to modify in writing the terms of
the Lease before any such action could be taken.
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18.

The intent of the Lease therefore, as indicated by its

terms was to restrict the right of the parties to encumber or

otherwise take advantage of changing economic conditions
associated with an interest in the Lease or an interest in the
Premises.

19.

Defendants have willfully disregarded their obliga

tions under the Lease and have sought to obtain economic

advantage from breaching it in ways calculated to disadvantage
the plaintiffs.

20.

Despite repeated requests by plaintiffs, defendants

have willfully failed to keep and perform their covenants and
obligations under the Lease.

21.

Despite repeated requests, defendants have allowed

weeds and other obnoxious growth to accumulate upon portions of
the Premises.

22.

Upon information and belief, defendants have failed

and refused and neglected to maintain the Premises in good

condition as required by the Lease, and the Premises, including
but not limited to the improvements thereon, are in need of
substantial maintenance and repairs.

23.

Upon information and belief, in May of 1978, in

connection with financing which defendants obtained from First

Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and without plaintiffs' knowledge
or consent, defendants encumbered the Premises in violation of,
among other provisions, paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Lease.
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24. Upon information and belief, in June of 1982, in
connection with financing which defendants obtained from Valley
Bank and Trust Company ("Valley Bank''); without plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent, defendants again encumbered the Premises
in violation of, among other provisions, paragraphs 4 and 6 of
the

Lease.

25.

On or about December 8, 1987, without plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent, defendants executed, acknowledged and
delivered to Valley Bank a Trust Deed and Assignment cf Rents

by which defendants conveyed and warranted the Premises, and
thereby created an encumbrance upon the Premises.
26.

On or about January 5, 1988, without plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent, the aforementioned Trust Deed and

Assignment of Rents was recorded in the official records of
Salt Lake County Utah, as Entry No. 4571125, in Book 5994, at
Pages 1434-1439.

27.

On or about December 8, 1987, without plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent, defendants executed, acknowledged and
delivered to Valley Bank an Assignm.ent of Lease by which defen
dants sold, assigned and transferred the Lease to Valley Bank.
28.

On or about January 5, 1983, without plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent, the aforementioned Assignm.ent of Lease
was recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County, Utah,

as Entry No. 4571126, in Book 5994 at Pages 1440-1444, attached
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as an exhibit to a UCC-1 Financing Statement executed by
defendants as debtor and Valley Bank as secured party.

29.

Although the Lease did not require notice of default

by the Lessees, on March 30, 1988, plaintiffs notified defen
dants in writing by certified mail that defendants were in
default of their covenants and obligations under the Lease and

that plaintiffs' intended to terminate the Lease.

True and

accurate copies of said notice and return receipt showing
delivery to defendants on March 31, 1988 are attached hereto as
Exhibit 'C" and incorporated herein by reference.

30.

On April 29, 1988, plaintiffs mailed to defendants, by

certified mail, written notification that defendants were in
default of their covenants and obligations under the Lease and

of the plaintiffs' intention to terminate the Lease.

True and

accurate copies of said notice and of return receipt showing
delivery to defendants on May 2, 1988 are attached hereto as
Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by this reference.

After receiving said notices, defendants continued to fail

to keep and perform their covenants and obligations under the
Lease.

31.

On May 31, 1988, plaintiffs, by and through their

attorneys, mailed to defendants by certified mail written
notification that plaintiffs declared the Lease terminated as
of the date on which defendants first received a copy of said

0C0QG3

letter.

True and accurate copies of said letter and the return

receipt showing delivery to defendants on June 1, 1988, are
attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by
reference.

32.

In a letter dated September 28, 1988, defendants, by

and through their attorneys, controverted plaintiffs' right to
terminate the Lease and threatened to sue plaintiffs for dam

ages by reason of plaintiffs' unwillingness to consent to the
aforementioned encumbrances by defencants in favor of Valley
Bank. A true and correct copy of said letter is attached here
to as Exhibit "F" and incorporated herein by this reference.
COUNT ONE

(Breach of Covenant Not to Assign)

33.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein paragraphs

1 through 32 of this Complaint.

34.

Defendants have failed to keep and perform their

covenants and obligations described in paragraph 4 of the Lease

for a period in excess of 60 days; such failure is within the
contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Lease; by reason of such
failure, plaintiffs were entitled to terminate the Lease;
^-ntiffs duly terminated the Lease in accordance with its
plai:
terms effective no-)t

later than June 1, 1988; and since tha

date, plaintiffs have been and are now entitled to immediate
possession of the Premises, including but no-

limited to all

OGQCIO

improvements and fixtures thereon and all rents and profits
therefrom

35.

An actual dispute and justiciable controversy exists

between plaintiffs and defendants with respect to their status
and other legal relations under the Lease.

36.

Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages

in an amount

not

less than the rental

and all

other

amounts

which became due and payable pursuant to the Lease prior to its
termination.

37.

Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages

for defendants' wrongful withholding of possession of the
Premises in an amount equal to the reasonable fair market
rental value of the Premises from and after the termination of

the Lease until the date on which plaintiffs recover possession
of

the Premises.

38.

Defendants have wrongfully retained and continue to

wrongfully retain rents and other monies generated from the
Premises and have refused to vacate the Premises.

While

defendants are wrongfully in possession of the Premises,

defendants are liable for keeping and performing all covenants
and obligations contained in the Lease until such time as

plaintiffs recover possession, including but not limited to

real property taxes, repairs and maintenance, public liabilitv
insurance,

casualty insurance, etc.

~10~
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39.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an order evicting defen

dants from the Premises and putting plaintiffs in possession of
the Premises.

40.

Pursuant to the Lease, plaintiffs are entitled to an

award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution
of

this

matter.

COUNT TWO

(Breach of Covenant to Maintain)

41.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein paragraphs

1 through 40 of this Complaint.
42.

Defendants have failed to keep and perform their

covenants and obligations described in paragraph 5 of the Lease
for a period in excess of 60 days; such failure is within the
contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Lease;

by reason of such

failure, plaintiffs were entitled to terminate the Lease;
plaintiffs duly terminated the Lease in accordance with its
terms

effective not

date,

plaintiffs

later than June

1,

1988;

and since that

have been and are new entitled to

possession of the Premises,

immediate

including but not limited to all

improvements and fixtures thereon and all rents and profits
therefrom.

43.

Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages

in an amount not

less

than the rental

and ail

other

amounts

which became due and payable pursuant to the Lease prior to its
term.inat ion .

-11-

0GC0I2

44.

Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages

for defendants' wrongful withholding of possession in an amount

equal to the reasonable fair market rental value of the
Premises from and after the termination of the Lease until the

date on which plaintiffs recover possession of the Premises.
45.

Defendants are liable for keeping and performing all

other covenants and obligations contained in the Lease until
the date on which plaintiffs recover possession of the
Premises, including but not limited to real property taxes,

repairs and maintenance, public liability, casualty insurance,
etc.

46.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an order evicting defen

dants from the Premises and putting plaintiffs in possession of
the Premises.

47.

Pursuant to the Lease, plaintiffs are entitled to an

award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution
of this matter.

COUNT THREE

(Breach of Covenant Not to Encumber)
48.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein paragraphs

1 through 47 of this Complaint.
49.

Defendants have failed to keep and perform their

covenants and obligations described in, among other paragraphs,

-12-

GCGG13

paragraph 6 of the Lease for a period in excess of 60 days;
such failure is within the terms of the Lease provisions,

including but not limited to paragraph 9 of the Lease; by

reason of such failure, plaintiffs were entitled to terminate
the Lease; the plaintiffs duly terminated the Lease in accor
dance with its terms effective as

of June 1,

1988;

and since

that date, plaintiffs have been and are now entitled to imme
diate possession of the Premises,

including but not limited to

all improvements and fixtures thereon and all rents and profits
therefrom.

50.

Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages

in an amount not

less than the rental

and all other amounts

which became due and payable pursuant to the Lease prior to its
termination.

51.

Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for actual damages

for defendants' wrongful withholding of possession in an amount
equal to the reasonable fair market rental value of the
Premises from and after the termination of the Lease until

the

date on which plaintiffs recover possession of the Premises.

52.

Defendants are liable for keeping and performing all

other covenants and obligations contained in the Lease until
the date on which plaintiffs recover possession of the

Premises, including but not limited to real property taxes.
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repairs and maintenance, public liability insurance, casualty
insurance,

etc.

53. Plaintiffs are entitled to an order evicting defen

dants from the Premises and putting plaintiffs in possession of
the Premises.

54.

Pursuant to the Lease, plaintiffs are entitled to an

award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution
of this matter.

COUNT FOUR

(Appointment of Receiver)

55.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein paragraphs

1 through 54 of this Complaint.

56.

As set forth herein, plaintiffs have commenced proceed

ings to regain possession of the Premises and plaintiffs are
entitled to regain possession as the lawful owners of the
Premises.

57. Upon information and belief, defendants are in
imminent danger of insolvency, as set forth in Exhibit "F".
58.

A dispute also exists as to entitlement and to the use

and possession of the premises. Plaintiffs have an interest in
the Premises, believe that they have good and paramount title
thereto and are entitled to the rents from the Premises for use

and possession. Upon information and belief, such rents are in

GGG015

danger of being lost by being applied fcr the benefit of
persons not entitled to the rents.

59.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" and incorporated herein

by this reference are the 1988 Valuation and Tax Notices issued
by the Salt Lake County Treasurer for the Premises in the total
amount of $37,526.84.

These real property taxes are due and

payable before 12:00 o'clock noon on November 30, 1988.
60.

Upon information and belief, by reason of defendants'

failures and neglects, subtenants occupying space within the
Premises are in default in the payment of their rents and the

performance of their obligations.

61.

By reason of the foregoing, plaintiffs' interest in

the Premises is in danger of being materially injured.
62.

In order to protect their interest in the Premises,

plaintiffs are now entitled by law to the appointment cf a
receiver to obtain the business records of defendants and their

existing property manager, and any rents and income held by
either of them,

all as reasonably necessary to operate tne

Premises, to serve without bond, and to have full authority

under supervision of this Court to pay operating expenses and
make necessary repairs.

Defendants, together with their agents

should be barred and enjoined by restraining order or injunc

tion from asserting any right to manage, supervise, or
otherwise direct operation of the Premises, or to occupy any

-15-
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part thereof under any claimed status, and that the receiver be
empowered to collect all rents, issues, and profits from the
Premises for the benefit of plaintiffs, to account for the

same, to expend necessary maintenance, insurance, and other

operating expenses, to remit the excess of rents, issues and
profits collected from the Premises over such necessary expen
ditures to this Court pending its further decisions, and to
advertise, to lease or rent space to existing or new tenants,

to remove any occupants not lawfully occupying and paying fair
rental value, to employ professionals, to hire and fire

employees, to enter into service contracts relating to the
Premises, to maintain any legal action necessary to protect the
Premises, and to otherwise have and exercise all lawful powers
of

a receiver.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court enter its
judgment declaring as follows:
On Count One:

1.

Defendants have failed, refused and neglected to

perform their covenants and obligations under the Lease;
2.

The Lease has been terminated in accordance with its

terms and plaintiffs are now entitled and have been entitled to
immediate possession of the Premises since its termination;
3.

The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual

damages against defendants for the rent and all other amounts,

- 16 -
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which became due and payable under the Lease prior to its
termination;

4.

The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual

damages against defendants for the fair market rental value of
the Premises since the termination of the Lease and for other

damages as may be proven at trial;
5.

The defendants shall vacate the Premises forthwith and

grant plaintiffs restitution of possession of the Prem.ises;
6.

For the time defendants were in possession of the

Premises defendants are liable to plaintiffs for ail damages
resulting from defendants'

failure to keep and perform all

covenants and objections contained in the Lease.
7.

The Plaintiffs

shall have and recover their

attorney's fees and expenses,

reasonable

and costs of court and that the

Court grant such other and further relief as may be appropriate
under the circumstances.
On

1.

Count

Two

Defendants have failed,

refused and neglected to

perform their covenants and obligations under the Lease;
2.

The Lease has been terminated in accordance with

its

terms and plaintiffs are now entitled and have been en:it led to

immediate possession of the Premises since its termination;

3.

The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual

damages against defendants for the rent and all other amounts

-17-
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which became due and payable under the Lease prior to its
termination;

4.

The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual

damages against defendants for the fair market rental value cf
the Premises since the termination of the Lease and for other

damages as may be proven at trial;
5.

The defendants

shall vacate the Premises

forthwith and

grant plaintiffs restitution of possession of the Premises;
6.

For the time defendants were in possession of the

Premises defendants are liable to plaintiffs for all damages
resulting from defendants' failure to keep and perform all
covenants and objections contained in the Lease.
7.

The plaintiffs shall have and recover their reasonable

attorney's fees and expenses, and costs of court;

and that the

Court grant such other and further relief as may be appropriate
under
On

1.

the circumstances.
Count

Three

Defendants have failed, refused and neglected to

perform their covenants and obligations under the Lease;
2.

The Lease has been terminated in accordance with its

terms and plaintiffs are now entitled and have been entitled to

immediate possession of the Premises since its termination;
3.

The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual

damages against defendants for the rent and all other amounts
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which became due and payable under the Lease prior to its
termination;

4.

The plaintiffs shall have and recover their actual

damages against defendants for the fair market rental value of
the Premises since the termination of the Lease and for other
damages as may be proven at trial;

5.

The defendants shall vacate the Premises forthwith and

grant plaintiffs restitution of possession of the Premises;
6.

For the time defendants were in possession cf the

Premises defendants are liable to plaintiffs for all damages

resulting from defendants' failure tc keep and perform all
covenants and objections contained in the Lease.

7.

The plaintiffs shall have and recover their reasonable

attorney's fees and expenses, and costs of court; and that the
Court grant such other and further relief as may be appropriate
under the circumstances.
On Count Four

1.

For an order requiring defendants and their agents, to

turn over to plaintiffs all rents, income and revenues from the
Premises, and all books and records related thereto;
2.

For an appointment cf a receiver for tne Premises;

3.

For plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses, and

costs

of

court;
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4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

appropriate.

DATED this

/»

day of November, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Michael

JENNINGS,

R.

Carlston

STROUSS & SALMON

M.

Steenolik

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs'

c/o William K.

Address:

Evans

3690 Gilroy Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

-20-
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH

>
: ss .

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

William K. Evans hereby deposes and states that he has read
bel^lxED this _J_ day of November, 1988.
t- r ^

-

William K.

Evans

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this/^day of November,
1988.

My Corn-mission Expires:

3i
SCMMRC39 5
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To^f-wl NrU.r ?! Jack, >*

Rercrccr, S..U L"k: Ccurty, UU^"*
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j

LEASE AKP OPTIONS v <?C

By

,,^^_

THIS INBESTUKE MADE AND ENTERED EITO this /-^^ day of

October, 1960, fey" and between EARL E. ROYS and VIVIAH HOKE, his
wife,

and JOHN O. HOWE and RAXIHS HOKE, his wife,

of Salt Lake
i

County, Utah, hereinafter referred to ai Lessors and J. E, LEHK52RS,
HERMAN L. FRW1C3 and STANFORD L. HALE, copartners, doing buoiness
i

under tho flm name and style of VALLEY SnoppitJG CENTER, herein-" i

after referred to as the Lessees.

|
j

That the Lessors,

for and in consideration of the cove.'-..-•*

nants and agreements hereinafter Mntionod to be fcept, paid and

t

*

' v

'

• -

". - ' -

perforrued by the LeeaoeB, has demised and leased to the Lessees

that certain real eBtate Bituated in Murray, Bait Lake County,
Utah, score particularly described as follovsi
• Cotrcjencing at a point 52 rods Kest and 14 rods North .
from the Southeast corner of the North\x3St quarter of
6ection 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Hcridian, and running thonce North 66 rods, uvore or
less,

to the North line of the Eouth half of said

Northwest quarter/ thence West along Bald Worth line
953 feet, itore or less, to the Northeast corner of
premises described in deed recorded as Entry No. 326063,

"5

Doscrip- ^f-

tion

J

Official Records/ thence South 1° 02' West 337.6 feet,
moro or lees, to the Southeast corner of said preAiBea/
thence wast along the Southorly boundary of Bald
premises 226 feet, mora or less, to the Southwast
corrver thereof, thonce onward Vest 321.75 fest, oore

or less, to the Northwesterly corner of a parcel of
land dascribod in deed recorded ss Entry No. 165237,
Official Records/ thence following tho exterior

•j

^j|

boundaries of a parcel of land described in Bald doed

South 19 rods/ thence South 27° 4S* East 32.7 rods')

thence South 50° 05* East 11.2 rods'/ thence South 4'.5
rods, more or leBS, to the South line of Bald Northwest
quarter/ thonce East along the South line of eaid

Northwect quarter to a point on the Northerly line of
Vine Street/ thence North 46° 43' 30" Eaet 71.5 feet/
thence East 189 feet/ thence South 300 feet to'the '

center of*Vine Street/ thence South 51° 24'' East along
the center of Vine Street to a point 4.5'chains'Vest
and South 2° East from the Northeast cornor of the ,'•
Korthwost quarter o£ the Eouthvcct quarter of said -'•
/•'I

GOG027
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West
section 17, thence »i«^->,
North 2iQ *«"

to a point on the

South lino of said No^vost^aarter,
14 rod*/ thence East 46.? roto^ oore

•.

i^f^rr*.^^

^enCO BDrth

^

^ ^ capltai

.

TO HAVE AN. TO ^ *« S»* UNTO the *»«. *™ the

15th day o« October, 1*0. « the 15th day of October. 2010.
, « Lessee covenants and agrees to pay by way of rent

for said pro^rty «- 1 ^ -— ^ *"" 87'5°°*00* '
receipt of ^ich is h«* pledged, Second year. ,7.500.00.
ital

payable one W^ - «., -ird year. .£,.000.00,
year thereafter *,« «- ~ of thl. ^,024.000.00 ^ y~
The rental provided herein payable after the first ,.« *-» p5ld in e.ai — ly U.t.»~t. on the fir.t «•* of —
B,d the first -y of each and every ,onth thereafter during the
tern of this Leaeo.

.2

- * ii

in addition to the rent hereinbefore

Lessees shall, in aaaitiu«

6criboa p^rtv. -a «* ^-nt. —

- *~« th6r"n

additional
Rental

sligstions

ot.,.. «*«,.. for .ervloe. or utility —«- « the -.«« »

any te^ts of the —

.!«-«- ^ «- -l- Pr~lS°-

S. « 1. asreoa between the partle. hereto that the

purpose of
lease

^.e. eon^l*. to an* P^ant to t^a«^— «- (
ieon.twti» .«- — — -*"'on th" *"l"a prrolBe!
ivhlcH .,.,1 collate th.. Installation of utmtle-Pcn th. *-,
,„. ., » to scrva .11 P«t.
thereof, the construction
.I
-.•-<...'--••--

rtiBed premises so e» tu

o£ ^xeu,,. »o other uprov-ot. on 6Bi= Pre,Ue, „a the «*-

Title to

ircproveroents

leBBl„g of th. .— ** .i^ov^nf Place, upon «1- ^l...

pr^e .h.llW» th. proportv of th. -co. ...lo^- thl.
-2-
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Lease regains in full force and effort.

4. Lessees shall have the right to assign this Lease

and Option to purchase to a corporation to be forced for^tho pur

posed carrying out'the'ter*. of this Agreement. Such assignment
Ehall not releose the Lessee of any liabilities hereunder. Except

\ssignn>ent
~l Lea&e

as to the assigns permitted pursuant to this paragraph, this
Lease shall bo unassignable except vith the prior consent of the _
Lessors. Provided, hoover, that the Lessees or their assignee^
as herein provided shall have the right to enter into subleases of

and sub

leasing

portions of the talsad praises.'provided," hovever, that «id
sublease, shall not attach to or become binding in any vay upon

the fee interest of the Lessors, that said lessees shall be Halted
to that class of business commonly known of as "retail trade and
service".

5. Lessees agrees to be responsible for the entire de

mised praises, and during the' ten, of the lease to maintain the
sa.-* and keep it free firoa weeds and other obnoxious growth/ that
HaintenanoO
of

prereifres

it will not allow any of it. lessees to conduct any business or

perform any act in violation of the ordinance, orregulatlons of
Hurrary City, the laws of the State of Utah or the United States
Government.

6. Lessee agrees to keep the demised premises free and
Liens

clear of all liens and encumbrances of any nature ^ataoever, ex

cept as to thos* liens created pursuant to Paragraph 14 hereof.
7. The Lessors shall have the right at all reasonable
Inspoction

tir.es to inspect the tolsed pre^lses^and any and all improvements
placed thereon.

'•

*~ - " •-

' ."

8. It is covenanted and agreed between the parties
landlord's
lien

hereto.that the Lessor does not by anything herein contained vaiUe
• ''•'; ""-

- 3-'

'•'' '•'

. ivi»»o» >hc Etc.c»r%.
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VMS U1 '^-

uo

,oy rights under an. pursuant to th. landlord-, lien 1- a. pro
viso by the statutes of the State of Otah.

9. should lessee, fail to pay th. rant heroin reserved
or ma*, any of th. other payments or barges to be paid by the.
;rnino-

ion upon
dfault

hereunder or fall to *»P any covenant herein contained to bo per
formed by Leasee, or within sixty (60) day. thereafter, then in
that event, without notice from th. lessors, thi. Agreement shaU
«,„. and terminate, and tho Lessee, .hall surrender said premise.
to the Lessors.

10. If tho Lsbbw. .hall abandon or vacate Bald premlec

or. for causa, be removed therefrom, th" — -Y *° «-l* b* th0
lessor for such rent and on s|>=h ten,, a. «•!«.« »V reasonably
>eoeeo's

.lability
ipon

5sfou.lt

obtain, and If a sufficient mm Bhall not ba thus realized to sa
tisfy the mlnl^u* rent hereby reserved, the Lessees agree to pay
and satisfy all deficiencies.

' 11. If Lessees shall iw*. or attempt to make an assign

ment for the benefit of creditor..'or If .petition for voluntary
„r involuntary bankruptcy 1. filed against or on behalf of Lessees
the Lessor may termlnato this Lease and an mount equal to the
Assignment
for credi
tors and
banV-ruptcy

total of the minimum monthly rental for each and every month then
regaining in the term of thi. lease shall Mediately booone due

and payable, less such sum a. Lessor may bo able to realize by rorentin, the premises for such.rent and on such term, as Lessor may
see

fit.

12. This Agreement Bhall not be Bodifisd or changed ex
Changes

loirs and
successors

cept by the written agreement of the parties hereto, o
,
13.' This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of end
be binding upon the heirs, successors, personal representatives,
administrators, and assigns• of the parties hereto.
"^':i..; ;:."-•-.v."f "• ;-^4-:': '•"•"• ' •

•
•

•.""•

,_„o"»:i>e>*

wamt iimtDH »*o Ei-oo.i"
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14.

t o i ii*l

C'J

The Lessors agroo that upon tho Lessees supplying

thea with a duplicate original lease between the Lcssoos and some

tenant qualified by the tonne of this Agroeroont to bacon* a sub
lessee and providing the Lessors with full information concerning

the terms and conditions of the proposed mortgage and the construc
tion agreement providing for tho application of the proceeds of
the ease, the Lessors will subordinate their Interest in the land

upon which the Jjsproveoant is to bo roade to a Eingle first rortgage
of such reasonable aaount as may bo necessary to finance the con
Subordina
tion of

struction of the improvements called for by said Lease Agreement.

Lessors'
interest

said subordination shall be exocuted by the Lessor, conveying caii

to Mort

gagee

property to tho Lcesoq or Rib-lessee as the case iaay be, vho shall

cause a first mortgage to bo placed thereon and to reconvay said
property to the Lesser without any assumption by the Lessor of the

obligation to pay any sunt cue or to become due by reason of said
mortgage.

15.

The Lessees are hereby given an Option to buy any

Option

to buy

or all of the demised premises upon tho following terras and con
ditional

•

The purchase price for tho first t\»lve (12)_oonth«_ fol
lowing the execution of this Agxcercnt shall be $365,000.00, said

purchase price shall be increeced upon the first anniversary of
this Agreeraent by the sun of 620.00 por acre for each acre then
Purchase

prica

covered by this Leace, and upon each and every anniversary of this
Agreement for the first five years by e ID'jo amount, and thereafter
\

•••-/•-".

it shall bo increased 8100.00 per acre, for each aero then covered
by this Lease, per year.

16.

, -

The Option herein grcnted shall be e^arciood by the

fiathod of
exercise

Lessees giving notice in writing to the Lcseors of their exercise

of Option
."

.

.

«l
MO*'*' |»l.»o» ""D Il.O.1"

GGQQ31
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of this Option, describing therein the tract of land bo acquired,
and offering to pay the purchase price a. herein provided, upon
receiving a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying said land
to the Leasee.

:- ,"

"•',

•-•

'•'••'•'•

•?•'.'.

The Option hereby granted shall provide to the whole of

the said tract of land and to a ten-acro portion thereof, and

after said ten-acre portion or more shall have been purchased by

the Lessee, to' any other three-acre or larger tracts.

Should the

Lessee exercise option to purchase' a ten-acre tract or larger, but
ptlon to

pply to

less than the whole hereof, the purchase price'shall be tho pro--

ess than

he whole

rata share of tho total purchase price as herein provided for,
plus 610,000.00.

Tho subsequent tracts Df land shall bo at the

prorata acreage price hereinbefore provided, provided however that

the total purchase price shall not be more than the total purchase
price as herein provided.

17.

-"-

-'-. ••':

.•'/

Any tract so purchased shall be designated by the

Lessee; it shall be contiguous with itself and any tracts thereto

fore purchased by the Lessee; it shall have" four sides, i.e., a
racta

;ss than
le

street side, two Bide lines at right angles to the street, and

whole

a straight rear line; and the street frontage shall be in the Ban>a
proportion to the total street frontage that the area beara to the
total area.
;rra of

18.

This Option shall endure for fifteen (15) years from

>tion

date hereof.- The exercise of the right" of the Lessee to purchase
lees than the whole hereof shall effect a prorata reduction in the
•auction
i rental

rental payable hereunder, after the'payment of the'purchase price"
as herein provided.

19.

''

'"

The Lessor shall furnish the "Lessee, upon deinand,

istract

: title

a good and sufficient abstract of title'certified to as of the'-'-

data of this Agreement, or any.j^stfl^ubsequent thereto, and the
MO'r.T Iviiua »••

Iloohi* •

.

" '

"O

CCQO^
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obligation of the Lessors shall bo United to delivering a good
and marketable title as of tho date of this Agreement. Lcasora
covenant not to encunber the title to said property.

20. The Lessor, and Lessees each agree that should thoy
default in any of the covenants or agreeinents contained herein,

the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a
reasonable attorney's foe, which may arise- or accrue fror, enforcCost and

I

attorney's

j ing this Agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises

foes

i

covered hereby, or in pursuing any renody provided hereunder or by
tho statute, of the state of Utah whether such remedy is pursued
by filing a suit or otherwise.

21. As herein used, the singular nutter includes the

Buzsber and

gender

plural and the masculine gender includes the feninine and tho
neuter.

m 22. The Leesee covenants and sgreos to conusance construq^

-o^ienco
:onstruc-

-ion

tion of tho shopping center herein contemplated within «<?Pf~"GH /
days of the date of this Agreement, and to thereafter diligently
proceed with the developcant and construction of said shopping
canter.

.

23. Tine is of tho essence of this Agree^nt, including
:rce

sjeuro

the provisions of Paragraph 22. Performance of the conditions of
Paragraph 22. hoover, shall be cxcucod by strikes, accidents, nets

of God, weather conditions and other causes of nonperformance b2yoad tho control of the Lessee. -•
50
xos

-•.

24. Real estate taxes for the year 19S0 shall ba pro
rated as of the date" of this Agreeioent.'''

- •'

IH wrists wnER,-07#'the"parties hereto have caused this
-'

• '---7-

- •-

•
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Agreement to be

executed the day and year first above vrltten.

SWZ

LESSORS

6L

~^>^r***r, fvzfer^^
2&>Doing business ast
i

VALLEY BH0PPH3G CENTER,
LESSEES

BTATE OP UTAH

)
)

•»•

couirrv op salt laio3 )

_

,.

"'' On thisj^day ofOctober, I960, personally appeared
before w, EARL B. BOVK and VTVXAS>**. hi» vlfe. end Jons O. kwb!

and WKXNB HOWE, hi. vifo/^o, being first duly sworn. acV^ledgjc
to":^ that they executed the foregoina Lease and Option ** lasers
riv'co:rsipclon Expires!
•^ V

STATE O? UTAH

)
)

•«

COUNT* O? SALT LAKE ) .

nn fhia jy^day of OctoberI 1960, personally appeared

before M J. B. LEHS3ERR, HEKKAH L. PRAKKS and STAKFORD^HALE,

Who. being first Wevorn.' a^
the foregoing Lease and Option as Lossess.
i

Bota

\

Reoiding ot

/""i^^-Ky Cor»isslon Expires.
(MO" *"D '*

-e-
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
John P. Ashton (0134)
Brian S. King (4610)
Attorneys for Defendants

City Centre I, Suite 900
1"5 East Fourth South
-

_

_

—

c

r.-:

-•tv,

b<:::

utsh

it; the THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR'
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

JOHN 0.

HOWE,

Trustee;

STATE Or

N

AND

E

'

ROBERT E.

HOWE = r.d BONNIE F. HOWE,
r.uscand and «;:e; WILL IAll K.
EVANS ar.c CAROLE H. EVANS,

husband and v;ife, as Trustee;
and JLEITH H. STEENBLIK,
Plaintiffs

and

Counterclaim Defendants,
v

^

PROFESSIONAL

MANIVEST,

INS.,
Civil

a Utah corporation;
PROFESSIONAL

MANIVEST,

a Utah corporation,

through

'u d o e

No.

J .

£S:

L i r. r. i s

as Trustee;

MANIVEST CORPORATION,

rcrprracior;

INC.,

a Utah

and JOHN DOES I

10,
Defendants

and

Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

Defendants Professional Manivest,

Inc.

end Ma:

Corporation (hereafter "Manivest"), by and through its

INCE. TEATES
GEj-SIAHLEfi
>nr'. i. Sli:**3C
• !• ;3L— bCLf

•.:;; E2«-ioc:

rvest

the date of this Answer, and, as a non-material breach, fails
to justify forfeiture of the lease.

EIGHTH

DEFENSE

The terms of the lease between the parties do not bar

Manivest, in its ordinary course of business, from assigning
for security purposes its rights to a third party so long as
such conduct does not endanger or jeopardize plaintiffs'

interest or equity in the property which is the subject of this
action.

NINTH

DEFENSE

Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 66
of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in seeking to have a

receiver appointed for the property.

WHEREFORE, Manivest prays that plaintiffs' Verified

Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, that plaintiffs take
nothing thereby and that Manivest recover its attorneys'

fees

and costs pursuant to the terms of paragraph 20 of the lease
between the parties.

COUNTERCLAIM

Counterclaim-plaintiffs, Professional Manivest,
and Manivest Corporation,

Inc.

(hereafter "Manivest") counterclaim

and allege against the plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants
(hereafter "Howes")

as follows:

UNCL YEATFS
QELDZAHLER
C#ntr» I.SuU.BDO
Ias\ ^ounr Sojiri

S»l! L»ie C'ly
L*:i?-. bt'.'A
el'V S2*-1000
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1.

Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to

Utah Code Ann.

2.

§ 78-3-4.

Venue is appropriate pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 7B-13-1 and 4.

FIRST CAUSE 0"

ACTION

(Breach of Contract)

3.

Manivest is the successor to the interest of

J. E. Lehnherr, Herman L. Franks and Stanford L. Hale,

lessees

under that certain lease dated October 14, I960.
4.

Howes are the successors to the interest of the

original lessors under the same lease.

5.

Under paragraph 4 cf the lease agreement, the

leasehold interest may be assigned with the prior consent cf
the

lessors.

6.

At times prior to the date of this Complaint, the

Howes and/cr their predecessors allowed Manivest to tlecce

and/cr assign its leasehold interest in the subject rrctertv to

third parties and thereafter make improvements en the nrc-e-ty
without objection and without claim that such action
constituted a breach cf

7.

the lease.

On January 22, 1988, Manivest requested that

Howes consent to the assignment by Manivest of its leasehold

interest, solely for the purposes of security, to Valley Bank &
Trust Company.

P3INCE. YEATES
1 OELCZAHLEP

r Ciir. I. Slii.800

J E«t! Fogr-r- Sou!"-.

S*i: Lai. City
'"f. 81V

Under the terms of the Acknowledgment cf

{

Assignment Manivest requested the Howes sign and subsequent
correspondence forwarded to the Howes from Manivest and Valley
Bank,

it is clear that the assignment was for security purposes

only and did not jeopardize or endanger the nature, extent or

priority of the Howes'
8.

interest in the property.

Despite this full explanation and assurance given

by Manivest: to the Howes,
reason,

the Howes, without any legitimate

refused to grant consent to the requested assignment

and sign the Acknowledgment of Assignment.

9.

The withholding by Howes of their acknowledgment

of the assignment was unreasonable under the ci rcumstances,

constitutes a breach of the express and implied conditions of
paragraph 4 cf the lease between the parties and impaired

Manivest's working relationship with Valley Bank & Trust.
10.

Manivest has been damaged by the Howes'

withholding of consent in an amount exceeding $50,000,

to be

proven with greater specificity at trial in this matter,

rlus

consequential damages, Manivest's attorneys * fees and costs
pursuant to the agreement between the parties,

SECOND

CAUSE

OF

and interest.

ACTION

(Breach of Fair Dealing and Good Faith)

11.

Manivest realleges and incorporates by reference

the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 10 above.

12.

In addition to the actions outlined above,

In the

period beginning in approximately 1985, Howes made repeated,

•SINCE. YEATES

I1

* OELDZAHLEA

I

i L*mr« 1, Suli.eOC |(

'. E.i! Fourth Soulti 'I

S*l: Lake CUy

!

Uu- B4M'
(e;i; 124.1000

|
|!
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frivolous claims that Manivest was in breach of the lease

between the parties.
13.

The claims have been made by the Howes

as

a

pretext to obtain possession of the property which is the
subject of this lease and relieve themselves of what they

perceive to be disadvantageous contractual obligations.
14.

These actions on the part of the Howes

demonstrate a failure to deal fairly and in good faith with
Manivest

and further constitute harassment

and interference

with Manivest's regular business activity with the purpose of

impairing Manivest's ability to perform its obligations under
the

lease.

15.
Intentional

The Howes'

actions have been carried out

and malicious effort to divest Manivest

and Manivest has been damaged in an

amount exceeding $50,000,

to be proven with greater specificity

exceeding $50,000,
attorneys'

fees,

as

plus punitive damages in an amount

all consequential damages,

Manivest's

costs and interest.

WHEREFORE,

Manivest prays for judgment against Howes

fcilows:

A.

For judgment against Howes on Manivest's First

Cause of Action in an amount exceeding $50,000,
with specificity at trial in this matter,
carnages,

Manivest's attorneys'

to be proven

plus consequential

fees and costs pursuant to the

»RINCE. YEATES
* QELDZAHLER
f t»lt Pourt- Sourn
U:«" 8*111

its

interest in the property,

at trial cf this matter,

S*i: L**« City

cf

in an

-

± J-

agreement between the parties and interest.
B.

For judgment against Howes on Manivest's Second

Cause of Action in an amount exceeding $50,000, to be proven

with greater specificity at trial of this matter, plus punitive

damages in an amount exceeding $50,000, all consequential
damages, Manivest's attorneys'
C.

For

such

further

fees, costs and interest.
relief

as

the Court deems

equitable in the premises.

'5

DATED this

day of January, 1989.
PRINCE,

YEATES

&

Brian S. King
Attorneys for Kanives

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I hereby certify that, on the
1989,

/•? ~'L day of January,

I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy o

the foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM to
Michael
SNOW,

R.

Carlston,

CHRISTENSEN

the following:

Esq.

& MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah . 84145

Counterclaimants'

Address:

255 East 400 South,

Salt Lake City,

Suite 200

Utah 84111

6463k/010789

HINGE. YEATES

QELDZAHLER
Cnn« I, Suit. BOO
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IN THE UTAH

SUPREME COURT

JOHN 0. HOWE, Trustee; ROBERT E.
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P.O.

Box

11th Floor

45000

Salt Lake City,
(801) 521-9000

Utah 84145
Ronald E.

Gemt

M.

Steenblik

JENNINGS, STROUSS h SALMON
One Renaissance Square
Twc

Nortn

85004-2393

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
AppeI lees .

A.

PRINCE,

Nehring
Boevers

YEATES

City Centre
175

Central

Phoenix, Arizona
(602) 262-5911

James

East

I,

Fcurt

Salt Lake City
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for
Appei I ants.

*

(2374)
(0371)
GELDZAHLER

Suite

9 00

Sout h
Utah

r .jf O1

84111

nt

an;

error,

because some of the alleged defaults,

such as

the weeds,

were clearly technical.
b.

If

the decision was

effect of the alleged defaults,

based on

then Manivest

is

the cumulative

entitled to

a

new trial because the decision was tainted by the Court's legal
and factual errors as to several of the alleged defaults that
cumulatively formed the basis for
11.

The Howes'

costs was untimely under

Procedure.

Also,

lease forfeiture.

application for attorneys'
Rule 54(d)(1),

fees and

Utah Rules cf CiviI

the award of fees and costs was not supported

by competent evidence and was excessive.
ARGUMENT
I .

PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE LEASE DOES
OF THE MANIVEST ASSIGNMENTS

NOT APPLY

Paragraph 4 of the Lease states,

TO ANY

in pertinent part,

that "this lease shall be unassignable except with the prior
consent of the Lessors."

The purpose of this provision is to

permit a Lessor to determine the ability of the proposed
assignee of

Kendall v.

1965).

the Lessee to perform under the

Ernest Pestana,

Inc.,

lease.

See,

709 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal.

The purpose is not to prohibit using the Lease as

security for loans to the Lessee.

their Trial Brief,

Even the Howes admitted,

that paragraph 4 does not prohibit the use

of the Lease as security for the Valley Bank and other
(R. 435,

pp. 18, 30.)

Gypsum Co.,

in

See also,

14 P.2d 758 (Cal.

loans.

Chapman v. Great Western

1932).

IX.

THERE WERE NO LEASE DEFAULTS BY MANIVEST MATERIAL
ENOUGH TO WARRANT LEASE FORFEITURE.

Utah appellate courts have consistently voiced the

law's disfavor of contract forfeiture, strictly construing
forfeiture provisions against the party seeking that harsh
remedy.

Moon Lake Electric Association,

Western Constructors,
1988).

Inc.,

When forfeiture

and exorbitant recovery,

".

Inc.

757 p.2d 125,

128

v. Ultrasystems
(Utah Apo.

. . would allow an unconscionable

bearing no reasonable relationship to

the actual damage suffered, we have uniformly held it to be
unenforceable."

Perkins v. Spencer,

243 P.2d 446,

452

(1952).

The party alleging forfeiture must plead and prove its case by
clear and convincing evidence.
Mercur Mining Co.,

128 P.2d 169,

New Mercur Mining Co.
272

v. South

(1942).

Eorfeiture is available only if the breach "defeats

the very object of the contract" or is "of such prime
importance that the contract would not have been m.ade :f

default in that particular had been contemplated."
Corp. v. Hoicomb,

Po iyglycoat

591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979) (quoting

Willistcn on Contracts, 3d. Ed., vol. 12,

§ 1455).

Virtually all jurisdictions also require proot cf
substantially more than a technical breach before granting a
lease

forfeiture:

.

. the

law will

not

sanction

a

forfeiture

of possession where no substantial
occurs or
the lease

where a mere
is involved.

technical

Harar Realty Corp. v. Michiin & Hill,
213

(N.Y.

1982).

injury

breach

cf

Inc. , 449 N.Y. Sjpp.

Courts also agree that where a party

-J3-

2nd

continues to receive the benefit of the bargain, technical
breaches do not trigger forfeiture.

1n Southern Hotel Company v. Miscott, 377 N.E.2d 660

(Ohio App. 1975), the appellate court listed the equities the
trial court properly considered in finding no material breach
had occurred and forfeiture was unjustified:

(1) the

probability that the landlord would continue to receive the
benefit of the bargain by obtaining lease payments from the
tenant; (2) the tenant's substantial capital improvements on

the property; (3) the tenant's tender of rent immediately upon
being given noti.ce of forfeiture; and (4) the tenant's
substantial loss if forfeiture were granted.
The First and Second Restatements of Contracts

incorporate similar principles in §§ 275 and 241,

respectively.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 241 states

In determining whether a failure to render
or to offer performance is material, the
following circumstances are significant:
(a)

the extent to which the injured

party will be deprived of the benefit which
he

reasonably expected;

(b)

the extent to which the injured

party can be adequately compensated for the
part of that benefit of which he will be
deprived;

-40-

*

(c)

the extent to which the party

failing to perform or to offer to perform
will

suffer

(d)

forfeiture;

the likelihood that the party

failing to perform or to offer to perform
will cure his failure, taking account of all
the circumstances including any reasonable
assurances;

(e) the extent to which the behavior
of the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform comports with standards of good
faith and fair dealing.

The equitable principles outlined in § 241 of the
Restatement and in cases such as Southern Hotel all weigh

heavily against forfeiture here, as illustrated by the
following

facts:

1.

Even assuming the assignment^ of Manivest's

leasehold interest to Valley Bank or First Security Bank were
lease defaults,

these assignments merely allowed Valley or

First Security to step into Manivest's shoes and cure any
default under the Lease.

Because of the undisputed financial

strength of both lenders, Manivest's assignments actually
increased rather than decreased the probability that the Howes
would receive the benefits bargained for under the i96 0 Lease.

2.

Any nominal damage the Howes could possibly show

was compensable without requiring forfeiture.

Nonetheless,

Howes never asked for any award of compensatory damages but

instead requested the most far-reaching, radical remedy of

all:

a judgment terminating the Lease and forfeiting

Manivest's

leasehold interest.

their Trial Brief,

Even the Howes admitted,

in

that there were ether more conservative

-41-

the

V

remedies that would adequately protect their

pp.

interests (R.

435,

29-30).
3.

Forfeiture of the Lease was immeasurably harmful

to Manivest by depriving it of

a stream of

income the Court

found had a present value of over $500,000.

Moreover, Manivest

would lose its substantial capital improvements in the
property.

Although the Court purported to "offset"

amounts against the value of the Howes'
(Add.
this

No.

3,

p.

these

reversionary interest

7) no findings were made as

to the value of

interest.

4.

Before this action was filed,

Manivest completely

cured many of the technical breaches alleged to have occurred,

by voiding most of the "assignments" or

the Howes complain (Tr.

253-255),

"encumbrances" of which

and by increasing its

maintenance and weed and debris control efforts

.

Moreover,

even the newly-alleged defaults were readily curable.
322.

Over the decades, Manivest has paid its rent,

E£. Tr.

paid off

debt secured by the Lease and acted responsibly to address weed

control and related problems as they arose.
the Howes

have adequate assurances

perform its

that Manivest

lease obligations in the future,

determines what
5.

can and will

once this Court

those obligations are.

The above actions also establish Manivest's good

faith in dealing with the Howes.
of Manivest's

From this history,

The allegations and findings

bad faith emanate either from Manivest's good

faith disputes with the Howes over the proper interpretation of

-42-

the Lease (Trial Ex. 30, 32) or from trial court misperceptions
unsupported by evidence in the record (Add. No. 3, p. 4).
This Court should also consider the following

additional factors in weighing^the equities:
1.

The lease does not expressly require either

notice of forfeiture or opportunity to cure.

Moreover,

no

notice of default or opportunity to cure was given as to the

newly alleged defaults discussed elsewhere herein.

Without

notice or opportunity to cure, a higher standard than even
"material breach" should be imposed before forfeiture is

permitted.

This is especially true here, where the

requirements of the Lease were in dispute.
Bank of Utah,

N.A. v. Maxwell,

See, First Security

659 P.2d 1078,

1081 (Utah 1983)

(forfeiture not permitted unless contract is "clear and

unequivocal" or where notice of default is "indefinite or
uncertain"

Without a requirement of notice and opportjnity to

cure, virtually any pretext for forfeiture can be usee ty an
overreaching landlord,
2.

It

is

as is the case here.

clear

from the

record here

that

the Howes

were looking for any such pretext to either force

re-negotiations under threat of forfeiture, or actually make

good on the threat and end what they perceived (a Irr.ost 20 year;
later) to be a bad bargain.

They felt that they shou.rj be

getting $200,000 per year in rental rather than $24,00'
(R. 462),

and even argued that their "damages" include :

additional rent they could have imposed as a condition to
consenting to lease assignments (R, 708).

-C~.-

3.

As

also discussed elsewhere herein,

the Howes'

refusal to consent to the Valley Bank assignment breached the

implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.

One

who seeks equity must come before the Court with clean hands.

In light of the foregoing factors, this Court should
determine that, as a matter of law, there was an inadequate
basis

for

forfeiture cf

the

lease.
X.

AT MINIMUM, MANIVEST IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL
BECAUSE THE FORFEITURE DECISION WAS TAINTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL AND FACTUAL ERRORS.

Manivest submits that the

law and facts that

inform

the foregoing arguments compel reversal of the Judgment cf
Forfeiture and reinstatement of the Lease without

the need for

further proceedings, except on ancillary issues such as the
amount cf Manivest's attorneys'
Court

credits

conclusions,

some of

fees.

However,

the trial court's

the trial court's

remaining

even if this

findings or

legal

and factual

errors sufficiently taint the outcome to require a new trial on
the ultimate

If

4, 5 or 6 of

issue of

forfeiture.

the trial court had correctly construed paragraphs

the lease,

or

the Manivest Liquidating Trust

document;

if the court

had excluded evidence of

defaults,

ordered a continuance or

newly alleged

reopened the evidence;

if

the court had not made the findings as to which there was no

supporting evidence; or if the court had weighed a 11 of the
equities necessary for a determination of forfeiture,
that determination would have

been different.

__, n

-

A

perhaps

reversal

of
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and

trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence

maintenance issue,

which Manivest disputes,

are entitled to a new trial.

related to the

at most the Howes

Manivest does not dispute the

need for a new trial, given the taint created by the trial
court's

errors.
ARGUMENT

I.

CLEAR WRITTEN

NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE

WERE REQUIRED AS TO EACH ALLEGED DEFAULT THAT
FORMED

At

THE

BASIS

page 9 of

FOR

LEASE

FORFEITURE

their brief the Howes argue that the

lease did not require written notice of default.
Verified Complaint, If 29

brief.)

Nonetheless,

(Add No.

In Hansen v.

2 to Manivest's opening

they also argue that they gave Manivest

adequate written notice of

opportunity to cure.

See also,

the alleged defaults and an

There is no merit to these arguments.
Christensen,

545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976),

the seller under an installment contract

for the sale of

real

property (which is not dissimilar to a 50 year ground lease)
contended that the buyer's interest had been forfeited,

even

though no written notice of default or opportunity to cure had
been given.

Unlike the standard Uniform Real Estate Contract,

and like paragraph 9 of the lease at issue here (Add No.
Manivest's opening brief),

the contract in Hansen did not

require notice of default or opportunity to cure.
contract

1 to

"provided that after the continuance of

Instead,
a default

the
for

ninety days the seller had a right to exercise three options"

(i.e. foreclosure, forfeiture, or other legal remedy).
1154.
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I_d at

Nonetheless,

this Court held that these contractual

provisions "are not self executing.

They require some

affirmative act on the part of the seller."

The Court also

held that mere notice of termination, without opportunity to
cure,

was not enough:—

:

[T]he seller must give the defaulting buyer
a reasonable time within which to cure the
default.
Without this notice the defaulting

buyer would not know what to do.

He would

not have certain knowledge his tenancy was

at an end.

He could assume that the seller

may have waived default, or would elect to
enforce the contract rather than forfeit it;
or he could assume he would be permitted to
perform."

(Id . Footnote omitted.)-''
Hansen applies here, even in the face of paragraph 9
of the lease, which states that in the event the lessees "fail

2/

In Johnston v. Austin,

748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988), this

Court held that where the seller chooses the remedy of
acceleration of the contract rather than forfeiture,
notice of default and an opportunity to cure are net

necessary unless required by the contract.
To that
extent only, the Court overruled Hansen.
However, the
Court reaffirmed Hansen, as applied to contractual
forfeitures: "Forfeiture is a harsh remedy, and a seller
must therefore give a buyer notice of default and a

reasonable period of time in which to cure the default
before exercising a forfeiture provision."
748 P.2d
1086-1087 (citations omitted).
That this requirement

applies regardless of the contractual provisions is shown
by the next sentence of the Court's opinion: "In fact,
written notice of default
the contract."

3/

Id.

at

is expressly required by . . .

1087.

See Also, Restatement of the Law (Second) Property 2d
Landlord and Tenant, Vol 1, § 13.1, comment h. at p. 389
(1976):

The landlord may hold the tenant in default,
under

the rule of this

section,

for the tenant's

failure to perform a promise contained in the
(Footnote continued on next page)
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to keep any covenant herein contained to be performed by
Lessees, or within sixty (60) days thereafter, then in that

event, without notice from the Lessors, this Agreement shall
cease and terminate...."

First, this provision is not self-executing, even

though forfeiture is the only remedy expressly provided.

As

suggested in Hansen, the lessors could waive the default, or
they could elect to affirm rather than forfeit the contract and
sue for damages, specific performance or some other remedy, or

they could allow the lessees to cure.-'
Second, the fact that the Howes did give notices of
default and of forfeiture either evidences their belief that

paragraph 9 was not self-executing, or constitutes a waiver or
estoppel as to any claim that it was self-executing.
Third, the requirement of notice in Hansen is not

simply to inform the lessee which remedy the lessor has elected
to invoke upon the lessee's default.

The notice mandated by

Hansen is a product of simple fairness, bygiving the lessee

facing forfeiture "a reasonable time within which to cure the
default".

Hansen at 545 P.2d 1154.

Under Hansen, opportunity

(Footnote continued from previous page)
lease only if the landlord has requested the
tenant to perform and given him a reasonable
opportunity to do so.

4/

Also, paragraph 11 of the lease, now also relied upon by
the Howes

in their brief,

is

expressly not

self-executing.
Paragraph 11 provides that in the event
of lessees' assignment for the benefit of creditors, "the
Lessor may terminate this Lease . . .**
(Emphasis
added.)
As in Hansen, forfeiture is optional, not
automatic.

_5_

to cure is required regardless of which remedies are otherwise
available, even the remedy of a "self-executing" forfeiture.
Attached as Addenda "A", "B" and "C" hereto (Trial Ex.

30, and 31) are copies of the three notices (dated March 30,
1988, April 29, 1988 and May 31, 1988) offered up by the Howes

to justify forfeiture of Manivest's leasehold. The only
defaults complained of in these notices are the December 1987 January 1988 lease pledges to Valley Bank as security for
financing, and "piles of Christmas-time trash and last year's
crop of obnoxious weeds ... and ... the surface of the

parking lot is not and for some period of time has not been in
good order or repair . . .".

(Add. "A", p. 2).

Nonetheless, at trial the Howes summoned up a host of

other alleged defaults that were never the subject of any
notice of default prior to termination.

These same alleged

defaults also found their way into the trial court's Findings

of Fact (Add. No. 4 to Manivest's opening brief) and were the
foundation for the trial court's imposition of the harsh

judgment of forfeiture.

These "notice-less" alleged defaults

included:

1.

Purported encroachments in 1983 (Trial Ex.

10, Finding No. 5);

2.

A May, 1978 pledge of the lease to First

Security Bank as security for financing (Trial Ex. 11, Finding
No. 6), which was subsequently released (Tr. 253, 254);
3.

A pledge of the lease to Valley Bank as

security for financing in 1982 (Trial Ex. 12-14, Finding No.
7), which also was subsequently released (Tr. 254);
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4.

Lease assignments between Manivest

controlled entities in 1976 and 1978 (Trial Ex. 22, Finding No.
19);

5.

A purported assignment to the Manivest

Liquidating Trust on April 28, 1988 (Trial Ex. 21, 40, Finding
No.

20);

6.

Alleged violations of Murray City ordinances

in 1983, and in 1989 after the lease had already been

purportedly terminated (Trial Ex. 23, 26, 28, 37, Findings No.
21,

22);

7.

Alleged health and safety violations ob

served in 1989 or 1990, again long after the lease had purport

edly been terminated (Trial Ex. 39, Tr. 168, Finding No. 23);
8.

Underground Storage Tanks (Finding No. 24).

The Howes'

brief bristles with contentions that

Manivest enjoyed "grace periods" (p. 45) and the opportunity to
cure these defaults.

Howes'

This assertion is belied not only by the

failure to give notice of the alleged defaults

enumerated above, but also by the content of the notices they
did give.

Where is the "grace period" in the Howes'
notice of March 30,

1988?

initial

That notice simply stated:

"Based

upon these defaults, it is our position that we are entitled to
terminate Manivest's rights under the Lease" (Add.

"A",

p. 2).

The Howes' April 29, 1988, notice demanded performance17 but

5/

However,

the April 29 notice addressed only the lease

pledge to Valley Bank, not the allegations regarding
weeds, debris and potholes in the parking lot.

-7-

did not specify what the purported "grace period" was: "On
behalf of the lessors,

I hereby advise you that time is of the

essense [sic] and that we insist upon strict performance . . ."
(Add.

MB",

p. 2).

Other than indicating that time was of the essence,

this second purported notice gave no inkling of the period in
which cure was expected.

Was it 60 days, as one might infer

from paragraph 9 of the lease, or a longer or shorter period?
Did the period begin to run from April 29, 1988, when

performance was first demanded, or from March 30, 1988 when the
Howes attempted to terminate the lease without giving any

opportunity to perform?
(Add.

"C"),

The third notice dated May 31,

1988

purported to terminate the lease effective upon

receipt of the notice, even though it was sent only 32 days

after the April 29 notice first requesting performance.-y
Thus,

even the notices of default that the Howes did

give were too "indefinite or uncertain" to sustain a
forfeiture.

P.2d

1078,

First Security Bank of Utah,

1081 (Utah 1983).

Also,

N.A.

v. Maxwell,

659

forfeiture is permitted

only where the agreement itself has "clear and unequivocal

terms. "
of

6/

the

I_d.

Here, even if the Howes' tortured interpretations

lease were correct,

it

suffers from "ambiguity or

lack

The Howes also argue that Manivest was remiss in failing
to cure even after the date upon which its interest in
the

lease was

forfeited,

which the trial court

found to

be June 1, 1988 (Conclusion No. 8).
However, based upon
this finding, Manivest no longer owed the Howes any
contractual

duties

after

that

-8-

date.

of clarity" fatal to a claim for forfeiture, because it fai led

to provide Manivest adequate notice of what was required in
order to avoid forfeiture.±/

Id.

It is no answer for the Howes to

argue that Manivest

was put on notice of the newly alleged defaults by inclusion of
some documents on a pre-trial exhibit list, or that Manivest
was required to send out interrogatories to ferret out

allegations of default not contained in any notice, or even the
Complaint.

By this time Manivest's leasehold interest had

already been forfeited, at least according to the trial court.
Moreover, Hansen and Maxwell establish that it is the duty of

the party seeking forfeiture to provide adequate notice of
default,

not the burden of the party against whom forfeiture is

sought to play a guessing game.
default,

In short,

even if proven to be true, will not support the harsh

remedy of forfeiture,
Reeploeq v. Jensen,

if not

included in a notice of default.

490 P.2d 445,

447 (Wash. App.

on other grounds 503 P.2d 99 (Wash.
839 (1973); Tower v. Halderman,
App.

7/

allegations of

1972),

cert.

782 P.2d 719,

1971),
den.

rev'd

414 U.S.

720-721 (Ariz.

1989).

Another example of this ambiguity is the 60-day period
referenced in paragraph 9.
When does this period begin
to run?
Is some notice required to start the period,
even though that same paragraph purports to eliminate any
notice requirement?
Can the lessor secretly observe a
default on day one, hope the lessee doesn't discover or
cure the default, and then declare a forfeiture on day 61
as a "gotcha"?
To permit such a result is to forsake
fairness and to ignore the drastic consequences of
forfeiture.

-9-

Manivest argued the notice issues at trial in the
context of its objections, on grounds of surprise,
Howes' eleventh-hour default allegations.

(Tr.

to the

44-52,

96.)

Because these allegations did not appear in any pleading filed

by the Howes before trial, and because the trial court abused
its discretion in denying Manivest's motion to adjourn the

trial to permit Manivest to prepare a defense to the new
claims, Manivest had no opportunity to raise the notice defects
in any other context.

In any event, the trial court committed plain error in
premising the forfeiture on the belated default allegations.
Accordingly, the Judgment of Forfeiture and Order of Possession
must be reversed,

and the lease must be reinstated and

possession returned to Manivest.
II.

THE TRIAL
WAS

COURT'S

MANIFESTLY

FORFEITURE

OF

THE

LEASE

UNJUST.

Forfeiture here was manifestly unjust not only because
of the absence of notice and opportunity to cure,

but also

because it was based upon assignments that did not violate the
lease,

and upon technical,
A.

non-material defaults.

Manivest Did Not Violate any Prohibitions Against
Assignment of the Lease or Covenants Against
Encumbrance of

the

"Demised Premises".

The Howes concede that Manivest's assignments as

security for financing did not violate the prohibition against
lease assignments in paragraph 4 of

the lease.

Instead,

they

continue to argue that these assignments breached the covenant

in paragraph 6 against encumbering the "demised premises".

-10-

However, if the Howes (or their predecessors-in-interest)
intended to prevent the lessors from using the value of the
leasehold to secure financing, it was incumbent on the Howes to

clearly articulate this prohibition in the lease. General
restraints on lease assignments or encumbrances, which do not
unambiguously apply to pledges of the leasehold for security,
do not suffice, particularly when the consequence of a
transgression is forfeiture.

At page 43 of their brief, the Howes rely on R.

Powell's treatise on real property for an expansive definition
of the word "encumbrance". However, the Howes overlook
Professor Powell's comments which bear most directly on the
facts

here:

Modern courts almost universally adopt the
view that restrictions on the tenant s right
to transfer are to be strictly construed.
Thus it has been held that lease provisions

prohibiting 'assignments' were not violated
by
. . mortgaging the lease term; by sa.e
of the controlling stock in the tenant

corporation or change in the personnel of
the tenant partnership . . .

R. Powell, The Law of Real Property Volume 2, 1[ 248[1] at pp.
17-43, 17-44 (1991 ed.) (footnotes omitted). See also,
Restatement of the Law fs^cond) Property 2d Landlord & Tenant,

vol. 2, § 15.2, comment e., at p. 102 (1976) and illustrations
thereto.

Powell similarly states:

A lease, which creates a present possessory

interest in the tenant, is an entirely

separate interest from the landlord's future
reversionary interest in the property.

Thus, the tenant in the absence of a
covenant in the lease or a statutory

restriction, has the right to mortgage his
interest in the property separately.

r. Powell, supra, If 258[1], P- 17A-57 (footnote omitted).
-11-

The covenant against encumbrances of the "demised

premises" in paragraph 6 fails to differentiate between the
lessor's interest in those premises and the lessee's interest,
and thus cannot be construed as prohibiting mortgages of only
the lessee's interest under the rule of strict construction
suggested by Powell.

At page 36 of their brief, the Howes argue that

paragraph 6 was designed to protect their presumed right to
collect

rentals

Manivest's

from Manivest

interest was

subtenants

terminated.

in the event

However,

the Howes

had no

such right because they had no privity of contract with the
subtenants.

R. Powell,

supra,

at If 248[1],

p. 17-39.

See

also, the portion of paragraph 4 of the lease prohibiting any
subleases from binding the Howes.
Manivest

Instead, termination of the

lease would terminate the subleases and any

assignments thereof.

Accordingly, Manivest's pledges of its

leasehold interest or subleases could not jeopardize any

"right" of the Howes,

whether at law or reserved by the lease.

Nor did the assignments among the Manivest controlled
entities violate paragraph 4 of the lease.

The Howes'

to distinguish Prince v. Elm Inv.

649 P.2d 820

Co.,

Inc.

attempts

(Utah

1982) because it involved a tenant's right of first refusal are
to no

avail.

The

relevant

issue both

in

Elm and here was

whether a stranger has been inserted into the transaction.
fact

The

that the Elm plaintiff sought to enforce a right of first

refusal rather than compel a forfeiture does not diminish Elm's

precedential value.
822-823),

Under the principles of Elm (at pp.

limited partnerships that have the same general

-1 2-

partner, or wholly owned corporate subsidiaries, are not
"strange

rs" to the transaction, contrary to the Howes' argument

,t p.
32 of their brief.^ The quotes from Powell above
p

at

suggest that, if anything, the principles of Elm aPPlY wlth
even greater force to the issue of who is a stranger to the
lease for purposes of construing a prohibition on lease
assignments.

Also, the testimony of Larry Leeper or Swen Mortenson

about their understanding of the relationship between Manivest
and the Manivest Liquidating Trust, or about their relationship
w

ith the two entities, could not change the clear language of

the trust document.

That language provides that the lease at

issue here was excluded from the assets transferred to the
trust, and was retained by Manivest.

(Manivest Liquidating

Trust and Workout Plan, Note 1 to the Balance Sheet of
Diversified Realty, Ltd., Trial Ex. 22, 40).

Accordingly,

there was no assignment in violation of either paragraph 4 or
paragraph 11 of the lease.

B.

The Forfeiture of the Lease Constituted
A Windfall

to

the Howes.

In addition to the "assignments" discussed above,

Manivest also disputes the Howes' other allegations of default.

The Howes acknowledged as much here, by suing not
National Realty, Ltd., the limited partnership that was

the named successor tenant on the lease, but its general

partner Manivest, which was also the general partner of
the assignee limited partnerships (Tr. 262), and the
parent of the wholly-owned subsidiary assignee, Westco
Realty, Inc. (Trial Ex. 40, p. 2).

-13-
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Paragraph 6 played an important role.
the Howes'

It not only protected

reversionary estate, but also meant that a

responsible tenant would remain in possession.

financially

The Lease thus

left no room for a bank to "worm" its way into the deal to claim
the rental income from the subleases.

The Lease prohibited

Manivest from mortgaging its leasehold and thereby impeding the
Howes'

contractual right to collect rents in the event that

Manivest vacated the Property or was removed therefrom.

(Ex.

1,

% 10.)»
Read separately,

read in the context of applicable real

estate principles, and read together, paragraphs 6,

have only one meaning:

14 and 19 can

It was a breach of the Lease for Manivest

to encumber any real estate interest whatsoever, without the

Howes' knowledge and consent.
essential .

All of these paragraphs were

They were a comprehensive attempt to deal with all of

the various financing issues which could arise during the term of
the

Lease.

The practical consequence of this structure was that the
parties would be required to negotiate if either wanted to use

In Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1960), the
landlord successfully terminated the lease and retook poseesBion.
Afterwards,
when the landlord could not recover unpaid rent from the tenant, the landlord
sued the corporation to whom the tenant had assigned ite right to receive
rents

from

subtenants.

The court held that the

landlord could not

enforce the

lease and collect rents from the assignee who had taken the assignment of
eubrents as security for a debt.

If anything, the Baehr case further

illustrates why the HoweB had good reason to prohibit such assignments in the
Lease.
In Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum, Co., 14 P.2d 750 (Cal. 1932), the
court only considered whether a mortgage on a lease violated a prohibition
against assignments.

The lease did not include any other restrictions against

encumbrances.

-36-

its respective interest for financing purposes other than for the

original improvements.36

Rather than dealing with this financing

problem in a straightforward way, Manivest borrowed for its own
benefit and without informing the Howes.
Other courts have upheld this concept.

In Airport Plaza,

Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 198 (Cal. App. 1987), the
successor to the original master tenant on a 75-year ground lease

claimed the right to mortgage its leasehold interest, without the
owner's consent.

The owner had subordinated to the construction

of the original improvements.

Of the two pertinent paragraphs in

the Airport Pla^a lease, one addressed the "hypothecations" for
constructing the original improvements.

The other merely stated:

Except as otherwise provided in this lease,

lessee

shall not transfer or assign this lease in whole or in
part, or its interest hereunder . . . without receiving
the prior written consent of

Id• at 2C1.

lessor.

The tenant argued that because the Lease did not

expressly forbid leasehold financing after completion of the
improvements, hypothecation cf the tenant's leasehold interest
must be freely permitted.

Id.

term

TheBe paragraphs recognized the inherent uncertainties of a longlease which did not otherwise address poter.t lal changes in econo~ic

circ-

rstances.

For example, there were no percentage rents and r,c cost of

g s:;-Etrier,*.E,

Ex.

1.

Consequently,

at

the time cf trial

the total

t that would have been payable as rent was not $24,000 per year as
a 1leg ed by Manivest, but approximately $12,000 per year.
(R. 701).
This was
the b asis for the Howe's allegations in Paragraph 17 and 18 of the Corplamt.
(R. I •)
See Airport Plaza, Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 19E (Cal. App.
I9E7 i
This case is not like Bonanza, Inc. v. McLean, 747 P.2d 792 (Kan.
15c?) where the tenant sought financing only to construct additional improvemer.t s
The lessor clearly had agreed to subordinate for this purpose. The
an-,cur.

c o j rt

had nc trouble finding that the tenant 's financing was "for the purpose

rrvir.c dj*. the original intention cf the parties."
I_d. at 796.
In
Be-, a^. zb there was nc reference to any other prohibition in the lease against
cf

ca

e.the;r

assignments

or

encumbrances.

-37-
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STATE

JOHN O.

HOWE,

Trustee,

OF

et al.

COUNTY

UTAH

TRIAL BRIEF AND SUMMARY

Plaintiffs,
vs .

PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC.,
a Utah corporation, et al.

Civil No.

880907595

Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Defendants.

Plaintiffs submit the following Trial Brief and Summary in
Support of their position."

PRELIMINARY

STATEMENT

This action arises out of a lease (the "Lease")

pursuant to

which the Howes as Lessors required a portion of their farmland

to be developed as a regional shopping center.

Upon learning

'Most of Manivest's 29 page Trial Brief is simply a restate
ment of its earlier motion for summary judgment.
In response,

Manivest incorporates by reference its Response in Opposition to
the Motion for Summary Judgment which convincingly distinguishes
most of the authorities upon which Manivest relies.
Certain
cases, however, appear in a different context and require a
specific response.

As set forth above, an assignment for security is, by
definition, not a true "assignment."

It is a collateral

assignment and is not meant to be governed by a general

prohibitions against assignments.

Therefore, paragraph 4 alone

was not sufficient to protect the Howes.

Without paragraph 6,

Manivest may have been able to grant an assignment for security.
Paragraph 6 was essential.

Under Utah law, all rights or estates in land, including a

leasehold estate, may be mortgaged.

See Utah Code ann. § 57-1-1

et seq.; see also Bvbee v. Stuart, 189 P.2d 118 (Utah 1948).

An

assignment of a lease for security purposes is a mortgage of a
lease.

See e.g., Slane v. Polar Oil Co., 41 P.2d 490 (Wyo.

1935); Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 83 Ariz. 181, 318 P.2d 359
(1957).

A real property interest is mortgaged if the

circumstances demonstrate that the parties intended not to

transfer the entire estate but only to create an encumbrance upon
it.

General Glass Corp.

App.

198 8) .

v. Mast Const. Corp.,

766 P.2d 429

(Utah

The evidence is undisputed that the following liens and
encumbrances were placed on property interests associated with
the

Lease.

1.

party.

Resolution of Encroachment in favor of a third

The Quitclaim Deed of defendants signed by Larry

-18-

program which will keep all of the property in a clean and neat
condition.

In addition,

the Court should void the unauthorized

assignments and order that all interests under the Lease be

reassigned to the entity approved by the Howes in 1971.
Furthermore,

the Court should order the lessee to seek and obtain

lessor's prior approval before assigning the Lease to anyone, and
order that the Lease cannot be assigned for the benefit of
creditors.

The court should also order Manivest to immediately

obtain from Valley Bank a reconveyance of the tenant leases and
to make
VI.

no

further such encumbrances.~
MANIVEST HAS

FAILED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR ITS
THE COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

COUNTERCLAIM AND

The

First

Cause

of

Action

paragraph 4 of the Lease,

in

the

Counterclaim

is

that

under

the Howes had a duty to consent to the

Assignment to Valley Bank in 1988.

There is no way paragraph 4

can be pummeled into an interpretation supporting this claim.
The evidence is clear that the defendants did not obtain prior
consent as required for any assignment.

It is also clear that

paragraph 4 applies to contemplated assignments of the Lessee's
entire estate,

not to assignments for security purposes.

Even if

the Court were to conclude that the Howes had a duty to consent
to assignments for security purposes,

they are not required to

sign documents which could jeopardize their own fee interest or

JThe Howes reserve the issue of expenses and attorneys'
fees .

-30-
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1

expect a return of those premises at some date and expect it

2

to be maintained in a fashion so that it can be used for the

3

purposes set forth in the lease, namely a shopping center

4

and retail trade and services.

Paragraph 6 is the next provision that is of

5
6

import.

7

demised premises free and clear of all liens and encum

8

brances of any nature whatsoever except as to those liens

9

created pursuant to paragraph 14.

10

It provides that the lessee agrees to keep the

Paragraph 14 provides that at the outset the

11

lessees here, the predecessors in interest to Manivest,

12

would have the right to borrow money against the property in

13

order to construct the improvements that were initially

14

contemplated.

15

As a consequence of that,

the Howes did subordi

16

nate their interests to various loans that were made, as I

17

recall, totalling in the neighborhood of a million dollars,

18

which money was used to build the buildings that are out

19

there today, and paragraph 6 provides that with the excep

20

tion of those liens and encumbrances that the lessee may be

21

assigned or may not encumber — excuse me —

22

It is a provision separate and apart from the prohibition

23

against assignments.

24
25

the property.

Now, this lease is one that in some respects is
somewhat unusual.

Your Honor will see that it contains a

number of fairly harsh provisions against both parties to
the contract.

It is harsh against the Howes because it sets

a flat rate rent with no clause for adjusting those rents
over the years, even though the lease was for 50 years, and

obviously back in 1960 when the lease was signed inflation
was a shown fact of life and yet there was no acceleration

or adjustment clause pertaining to the lease payments.
On the other side,
9

the

lease is harsh on the

lessee because it provides that they cannot encumber or

10

assign their interests or, for that matter, any interest in

11

that property which essentially establishes a stalemate

12

between the two sides.

13

Reading through some of the hornbooks on property

14

law, it's not uncommon for leases to provide essentially

15

stalemated positions where the parties do not want to

16

attempt to anticipate what the future will bring and so they

17

build into the lease essentially a stalemate that requires

18

both sides to sit down from time to time and renegotiate

19

their positions, and that is what is contemplated by the

20

lease provisions here, that once the improvements that were

21

subordinated at the outset became obsolete or required

22

repair, required substantial infusions of capital,

23

it is obviously contemplated by the lease that the parties

24

would sit down and renegotiate their positions, that Howes

25

then being in a position to adjust the rents to meet the

it was —

1

market at the time of their renegotiation.

2

didn't happen.

3

That obviously

What the lessee has done here is they have

4

secretly, we have now found out, secretly breached these

5

provisions allowing -- or prohibiting liens and encum-

6

brances, allowing them to benefit from funding, but denying

7

the Howes the opportunity to sit down and renegotiate the

8

harshness of the provisions against them, and so the end

9

result is over the last 30 years and as of today the Howes

10

are receiving approximately one-twentieth of the rents that

11

are justified by the market values of their land out there.

12

The land is worth in the neighborhood of two and a

13

half million dollars.

14

dollars

15

whereas under any standard in the industry they should be

16

getting in the neighborhood of $250,000 a year, so what the

17

unilateral

18

is to deprive the Howes of the financial benefits that were

19

built into the lease that would have required renegotiation

20

from time

21

They are getting less than a thousand

a month for that under the current situation,

and secret breaches

of the

lessee have done

here

to time.

Now,

the evidence regarding breaches, your Honor,

22

is hopefully going to be fairly direct and to the point.

We

23

will start out by showing in 1971 that the lessee did in

24

fact come to the Howes and did in fact request that they

25

subordinate their interests and allow them, the lessees, to

